In his upcoming book "Alone in the Ring," former Indian Army Chief NC Vij sheds light on the intelligence failures that led to India being caught off guard during the 1999 Kargil War.
Gen Vij, who served as Director General of Military Operations during the war, highlights the following key points:
- Intelligence Lapses: Both military and civilian intelligence agencies failed to detect Pakistan's extensive purchase of winter fighting equipment, a clear indicator of their intentions in the high-altitude region.
- Misleading Assessments: The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, provided inaccurate assessments, stating there was no possibility of war with Pakistan that year. This led to a significant strategic failure.
- Late Detection and Confusion: The intrusion of Pakistani forces into Indian-controlled territory was detected late, and there was initial confusion about whether it was the work of militants or the Pakistani Army.
- Lack of Surveillance Equipment: The Indian Army was poorly equipped for surveillance operations, lacking high-quality equipment needed to monitor the region effectively.
The Kargil Review Committee, established after the war, held R&AW primarily responsible for the intelligence failure, citing a lack of information sharing and coordination among agencies.
Gen Vij also touches upon Operation Parakram, the military mobilization after the 2001 Parliament attack, criticizing the lack of clear objectives and the indecisive leadership that undermined the operation's effectiveness.
The book provides a critical analysis of the events leading up to and during the Kargil War, offering valuable lessons for India as it marks the 25th anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas on July 26th.
It also provides a unique perspective from a senior military leader involved in the conflict, adding to the public's understanding of the Kargil War and its implications for India's national security.
