This weekend, President Joe Biden is hosting the three other national leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, a loose grouping among India, Australia, Japan and the US formed in 2004. Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese of Australia, Narendra Modi of India and Fumio Kishida of Japan will be coming to Delaware for a final in-person meeting with the outgoing president.
The Quad nations have some common agendas on trade, tariffs, the environment, fisheries and security. Looming over all is aggressive Chinese behavior in the Indo-Pacific, from the disputed India-China border in the Himalayas to Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over Japan’s Senkaku Islands.
But the most salient reason for the US to be embracing the Quad is the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Why is that vast body of water increasingly vital? And is the Quad strong enough to meet the growing challenge of Beijing?
I will always remember the first time I sailed into the Indian Ocean as a junior Navy officer, coming out of the Strait of Malacca, which separates it from the Pacific. After the densely packed waters of the South China Sea and the scary, Formula 1-like jockeying in the Malacca Strait — where massive tankers and warships sail at top speed through very narrow channels — the Indian Ocean provides a wide-open seascape where those standing watch can finally relax.
The Indian Ocean covers 20% of the world’s water surface and 40% of global coastline, and is ringed by a third of earth’s population. Nearly 100,000 ships transit it each year, almost a third of global cargo. The region also has more than half of the world’s proven reserves of oil and gas. Yet this is the least explored and exploited large ocean, partly because the major nations ringing it — India, Indonesia, South Africa, Pakistan, Australia — have not had aggressive maritime programs. That is changing rapidly.
India is expanding its military capabilities, notably for air and sea operations. Australia is procuring nuclear submarines in the AUKUS program with the US and UK, and plans to more than double its surface fleet. Indonesia and Pakistan have increasingly credible navies (unfortunately, the latter is getting help from the Chinese). Singapore is modernizing its fleet and increasing its patrolling of the eastern Indian Ocean.
For the US, the Quad should be the foundation of an Indian Ocean strategy. In November, India will host the 28th iteration of the Malabar exercises, a huge training operation originally between India and the US, but now for all Quad members (and occasionally other friendly nations). A major focus will be antisubmarine and anti-air warfare. The exercises will take place in the Bay of Bengal, where Chinese “research ships” — often cover for surveillance efforts — have been increasingly active.
The Navy should seek to link Malabar 2024 operations with units of the US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain; new unmanned technologies being developed by its Task Force 59; and advanced US satellite and space warfare systems. Future Malabar exercises could lay the groundwork for Australian nuclear submarine operations; and the Quad should look to include some East African nations such as Kenya in the training.
The Quad also needs to look outside the military sphere. Proposals from previous summits for forging green supply chains across the Indo-Pacific, securing new undersea cables and setting up a health-emergency initiative need to become reality. And the Strengthening the Quad Act, passed by the house in February, needs Senate approval: it’s largely symbolic, but puts the US on the record as permanently committed to the coalition.
This will be the final Quad summit for Biden and for Kishida, who is also stepping down from office. Which makes this a precarious moment: The grouping was largely defunct until the late 2017, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made tremendous efforts to revive it. Allowing it to fade into obscurity again would be a huge mistake. These four democracies have a great deal in common, and by working together they can blunt Chinese influence and keep the peace in one of the most important and vast sea spaces on earth.
Admiral James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is the author most recently of “To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision.”
