China's long-standing military assistance to Pakistan has been a key element of its strategy to constrain India, creating a persistent security challenge for New Delhi on its western border.
Beijing has consistently provided Islamabad with advanced military hardware, ranging from fighter jets to potentially hypersonic missiles, using their close "all-weather" relationship to offset India's regional influence.
In contrast, India, despite its growing defence manufacturing capabilities and improved relations with Taiwan, has not supplied the island with Indian-produced weaponry.
This decision, which could have served as a strong signal of defiance to Beijing, remains unrealized, presenting a narrative of strategic intentions clashing with missed chances.
The defence partnership between China and Pakistan is both extensive and intentional. Over many years, Beijing has furnished Islamabad with a range of advanced military systems.
These include the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft (a joint Pakistan-China development), Type 054A/P frigates for the Pakistani Navy, and the HQ-9 air defence system, which closely resembles China's own defensive capabilities.
Reports in 2024 suggested that China might transfer its DF-17 hypersonic missile to Pakistan. This missile, capable of traveling at more than five times the speed of sound and with a range of 2,500 kilometers, could pose a significant threat to India's S-400 air defence system. The S-400, acquired from Russia in 2022, is effective against traditional threats but less so against hypersonic weapons.
This pattern of military support has historical precedent. During the border skirmish in the Galwan Valley in 2020, China's military mobilization along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was mirrored by increased Pakistani activity along the Line of Control (LoC). This raised concerns about a coordinated, two-pronged pressure tactic.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major component of China's Belt and Road Initiative, further strengthens their strategic alignment. Gwadar port, a key part of CPEC, provides China with a strategic position in the Arabian Sea, close to India's western coastline.
There is also the talk of the potential sales of J-35A stealth fighters to Pakistan, which was unveiled in 2024. This indicates that a part of China's strategy is to keep India engaged with security concerns in South Asia.
Beijing's strategic objective is evident: by arming Pakistan, it keeps India focused on a threat from the west, thus limiting India's attention on the LAC and its wider ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.
This approach is consistent with historical actions, including China's support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, and its assistance in the 1980s that enabled Pakistan to develop its nuclear capabilities.
Currently, with a substantial fleet of over 200 J-20 stealth fighters, China views Pakistan as a useful and budget-friendly proxy to strain India's military resources.
In stark contrast, India's policy toward Taiwan, a potential partner in resisting China's assertiveness, has been notably cautious. Taiwan faces constant pressure from Beijing, which considers it a breakaway province and has significantly increased military exercises simulating an invasion.
According to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense, there were over 1,700 incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by Chinese military aircraft in 2023, a trend that continued into 2024.
Despite this, and India's expanding defence production sector, India has not capitalized on the opportunity to supply Taiwan with domestically produced arms.
India possesses several military systems that could be valuable exports. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, co-developed with Russia and having a range of 290-600 km, the Akash air defence system, and the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher are all battle-tested and suitable for Taiwan's defence requirements. The Tejas Mk1A fighter jet, while smaller than some alternatives, provides a cost-effective option compared to American or European aircraft.
Additionally, India's DRDO has developed loitering munitions that could be useful in Taiwan's asymmetric warfare strategy against a potential Chinese invasion. While India demonstrated support for Taiwan indirectly, such as gifting 200,000 vaccine doses to Paraguay in 2021 to counter China's vaccine diplomacy aimed at Taiwan's allies, no significant arms transfers have materialized.
Several factors contribute to India's hesitancy. Indian foreign policy is carefully calibrated to avoid provoking China into further escalation along the LAC, where tensions remain high following the 2020 clashes.
India's acquisition of the S-400 system and its continued reliance on Russian military equipment also create complexities in aligning with Western sanctions regimes, which might perceive arming Taiwan as crossing a significant threshold.
Unlike China's open support for Pakistan, India does not have a formal defence agreement with Taiwan. India's "Act East" policy focuses primarily on Southeast Asia, rather than direct involvement in the Taiwan Strait.
The difference in approaches is clear. China openly supplies arms to Pakistan and integrates it into its wider Indo-Pacific strategy. This is demonstrated through joint military exercises, such as Shaheen-X in 2024, where Chinese and Pakistani pilots practiced stealth combat tactics. China's substantial $62 billion investment in CPEC further strengthens Pakistan's economic reliance on China, ensuring its continued alignment.
India, despite its growing defence exports, reaching $2.5 billion in 2024 (including exports of Wheeled Armoured Platforms (WhAP) to Morocco and artillery to Armenia), has not provided similar support to Taiwan. While the Indian Air Force has strengthened its own capabilities with 36 Rafale jets and 83 Tejas Mk1As, New Delhi's reluctance to leverage its relationship with Taiwan for military cooperation represents a missed diplomatic and strategic opportunity.
While Taiwan's requests for Indian weaponry have been understated, likely due to concerns about Chinese retaliation, informal communication channels do exist. India has hosted Taiwanese delegations, including a visit by former military officials in 2023, suggesting the potential for future cooperation. However, no firm agreements have been reached.
In the meantime, China's J-35A fighter could potentially be delivered to Pakistan by 2027, significantly enhancing the Pakistani Air Force's stealth capabilities, while India's own AMCA program is still several years away from operational deployment. This growing disparity suggests that China's proactive strategy of containment is outpacing India's more reactive approach.
India's decision not to supply arms to Taiwan represents more than just a lost opportunity; it constitutes a strategic deficiency. By providing military equipment to Taipei, India could indicate its willingness to engage in similar strategic maneuvering, applying pressure on China's eastern flank in the same way that Beijing pressures India's western border.
The BrahMos missile, for instance, could pose a threat to Chinese naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait, while Akash systems could help defend against Chinese drones, similar to how Pakistan's HQ-9 systems are deployed against India. Such a move could potentially discourage China from further arming Pakistan with advanced technologies like hypersonic missiles or stealth aircraft, leading to a rebalancing of power in the region.
