A prominent Pakistani policy analyst has cautioned that India's potential acquisition of the American F-35 Lightning II fighter jet could negatively impact its indigenous defense programs and create operational challenges for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Dr. Syed Muhammad Ali, in a recent interview with SUNO NEWS HD, outlined several concerns regarding the proposed deal.
Dr. Ali highlighted the significant financial burden the F-35 would place on India's defense budget. The F-35, a fifth-generation stealth aircraft, carries a substantial price tag.
Each unit costs between $80 million and over $100 million, and that figure doesn't even include the long-term expenses of maintenance, spare parts, and necessary upgrades. This substantial investment, Dr. Ali argued, could divert resources away from India's domestic fighter jet development programs.
Specifically, the analyst pointed to the potential impact on the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), India's ambitious fifth-generation stealth fighter project, and the ongoing development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas variants.
The AMCA program has already received a significant investment of Rs 15,000 crore (approximately $1.8 billion USD), with a prototype expected by 2026-2027. The LCA Mk-1A and Mk-2 programs are also crucial for increasing the IAF's operational strength.
Dr. Ali warned that prioritizing F-35 procurement could lead to delays or reduced funding for these key domestic initiatives, potentially hindering India's "Make in India" self-reliance goals.
This concern is also shared by some within India's defense establishment. The IAF currently operates significantly fewer squadrons than its authorized strength, and while the F-35 could offer a rapid, albeit temporary, solution, some fear it could undermine India’s pursuit of long-term technological independence.
Beyond the financial implications, Dr. Ali stressed the operational challenges of integrating the F-35 into the IAF's existing fleet, which is primarily composed of Russian and French aircraft.
The IAF has decades of experience operating Russian platforms like the Su-30 MKI and MiG-29, as well as French jets like the Rafale and Mirage 2000. However, it has no history of operating American-made fighter jets.
The introduction of the F-35 would, therefore, require considerable investment in new infrastructure, pilot and ground crew training, and logistical adjustments.
The F-35's advanced systems, including its stealth capabilities and sensor fusion technology, require a support ecosystem that differs significantly from those currently in place for the IAF's Russian and French aircraft.
For example, the IAF's current in-flight refueling aircraft, the Russian Il-78, are not compatible with the F-35. Integrating the F-35 into India's Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), which utilizes a combination of Russian and domestically-produced radar and communication systems, would also present significant technical hurdles. These additional costs, according to Dr. Ali, could place further strain on India's defense budget.
The analyst emphasized the potential for a fundamental mismatch between the F-35 and the IAF's predominantly Russian and French-designed fleet. He stated that while integrating the F-35 is theoretically possible, it would be a complex and potentially problematic undertaking.
The F-35's communication and data-sharing systems, such as the Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), are designed for optimal interoperability with other U.S. and NATO systems, not the Russian or French systems currently used by the IAF.
This incompatibility extends beyond hardware to operational doctrine. The F-35 is built for stealth-focused, network-centric operations, relying heavily on real-time data from satellites and other assets.
This approach may not perfectly align with the IAF's current operational tactics, which are based on a more diverse fleet. Dr. Ali's analysis suggested that this could lead to operational inefficiencies and create divisions within the IAF.
Furthermore, India's existing acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system adds another layer of complexity. The United States has previously opposed the operation of the S-400 alongside the F-35, as demonstrated by Turkey's removal from the F-35 program in 2019.
Although the U.S. may be taking a more lenient stance with India, integrating the two systems could still pose risks to the F-35's stealth capabilities.
Dr. Ali also touched upon the broader strategic implications. Purchasing the F-35 could indicate a shift in India's defense partnerships, potentially impacting its long-standing relationship with Russia, a major supplier of its military equipment.
Russia has also offered its own fifth-generation fighter, the Su-57 Felon, for co-production, which might be a better fit for the IAF's current infrastructure.
While strengthening ties with the U.S. could bolster India's position in the Indo-Pacific region as a counter to China's growing air power, Dr. Ali's assessment urges a careful consideration of the financial, operational, and strategic costs of integrating a platform that may not seamlessly align with the IAF's present requirements and structure.
