A leading Pakistani defense analyst has cautioned that India's potential acquisition of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jet could present significant logistical and financial difficulties, mirroring some of the challenges Pakistan has faced with its F-16 fleet.
Retired Air Commodore Zia Ul Haque Shamsi, in comments to regional media, suggested the F-35 could become a costly burden for the Indian Air Force (IAF) due to high operational costs and ongoing availability concerns.
Shamsi argued that the fifth-generation F-35's overall cost, including both purchase and maintenance, is significantly higher than even the IAF's existing Dassault Rafale fighters. This substantial financial commitment, he believes, could strain India's air power capabilities. This mirrors the Pakistan Air Force's (PAF) difficulties in sustaining its F-16 fleet, offering a potential warning for India amidst increasing regional tensions.
The core of Shamsi's argument centers on the F-35's known high operational expenses. The F-35A, the variant most likely to be considered by India, has a basic "flyaway" cost of roughly $80 million per aircraft (as of fiscal year 2024). However, when factoring in training, spare parts, and support, the export price can easily rise to $100-110 million.
The more significant issue is the sustainment cost, which the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates at around $36,000 per flight hour. In comparison, data from the French Air Force and India's own experience with its 36-Rafale fleet suggest the Rafale's cost per flight hour is closer to $16,500.
Furthermore, the analyst highlighted the F-35's ongoing issues with reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA). These problems have affected even the U.S. fleet. Shamsi cited the 2023 report from the U.S. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), which revealed that the F-35 fleet had an average availability rate of only 51%, falling short of the Pentagon's 65% target.
Practically, this means that out of 628 U.S. F-35s, only about half were ready for missions at any given time. Combat-ready jets had a slightly better rate of 61%, but the overall fleet's full mission capability (FMC) was as low as 30%.
Shamsi presented a hypothetical scenario for India: "If the IAF acquires 60 F-35s, only around 30 might be operational at any given time, based on the 51% availability rate. To have 50 jets ready for combat, they would likely need at least 100, representing a huge financial outlay."
He attributes this to the F-35's frequent malfunctions – U.S. Air Force F-35As experience critical failures at twice the expected rate – and a struggling supply chain, where depot repairs often exceed the 60-day target.
The IAF, known for intensive training exercises like Operation Gaganshakti (2018), might find it difficult to keep even half of its F-35 fleet operational, particularly considering India's varied climates, from the heat of Rajasthan to the humidity of the Northeast, environments where the F-35's performance remains unproven.
A direct comparison was drawn with the PAF's experience with its 76 F-16s, a key element of its fleet since the 1980s. U.S. sanctions, imposed at various times due to Pakistan's nuclear program and shifting geopolitical factors (such as the Pressler Amendment in the 1990s), have severely limited the availability of spare parts.
This has lowered the F-16's operational readiness to an estimated 50-60%, similar to the challenges the IAF has faced with its Su-30MKI fleet (60% availability compared to a Western standard of 75%). The PAF has also been unable to acquire the advanced AIM-120D AMRAAM missile, relying instead on the older AIM-120C-5, limiting its beyond-visual-range (BVR) capabilities.
Over a 40-year lifespan, the total cost for a relatively small fleet of 110 F-35s could reach $80-100 billion, including maintenance (which accounts for 60-70% of operating costs), upgrades, and spare parts.
The Rafale F4, in contrast, is estimated to cost around $48-50 billion for the same number of aircraft over the same period – a savings of almost 40%.
Shamsi suggests that for the IAF, which already operates a diverse fleet including Su-30MKIs, MiG-29s, and Tejas variants, the F-35's high maintenance demands could divert funds better used for domestic programs like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
The current capabilities of the IAF's Rafale jets, equipped with the Meteor BVR missile (with a range exceeding 200 km), surpass both the AIM-120C-5 and the Chinese PL-15 missiles used on Pakistan's JF-17s.
Shamsi implies that India might risk creating a logistical problem similar to Pakistan's with the F-35, particularly given its dependence on a U.S. supply chain that could be affected by CAATSA sanctions, a concern that arose after India's purchase of the S-400 system from Russia.
While Shamsi's assessment aligns with criticisms from U.S. oversight bodies – the GAO's $1.7 trillion lifecycle cost estimate for 2,470 F-35s translates to roughly $44 million per aircraft annually – his viewpoint warrants further examination.
The F-35's stealth technology, sensor fusion capabilities (including the AN/APG-81 AESA radar and Distributed Aperture System), and focus on network-centric warfare represent a significant advancement over the Rafale. These capabilities could potentially be worth the cost when facing threats like China's J-20 (with over 200 units) and Pakistan's planned acquisition of the J-35.
Availability rates could also improve as production scales up, as evidenced by the higher rates seen in combat-coded U.S. jets. Additionally, India's strengthening defense-industrial relationship with the U.S. could potentially alleviate spare parts concerns over time.
On the other hand, the Rafale's established reliability (with the French Air Force reporting over 75% availability) and its existing integration within the IAF's 36-jet fleet present a less risky option. The IAF's current squadron numbers (30 compared to the required 42) highlight a need for quantity rather than specialized platforms, a factor Shamsi's analysis does not fully address.
A smaller F-35 fleet (perhaps 40 aircraft for specialized strikes) combined with Rafales and Tejas could offer a balance between capability and affordability. However, introducing a seventh type of fighter jet could indeed lead to the logistical complexities Shamsi predicts, reflecting the IAF's past challenges in maintaining fleet availability, which historically has been around 50-60% (according to a 2017 CAG report).
