Why Indian Navy's New P17B Frigate Will Cost $1.19 Billion Per Unit, 50% More Than Previous P15B

The Indian Navy is poised to take a significant leap forward in its naval capabilities with the acquisition of the P17B frigates. As the successors to the Nilgiri-class frigates, these vessels are expected to bolster the Navy's frontline combat strength.

However, the project has raised eyebrows due to the staggering cost of $1.19 billion per ship, marking a 50% increase compared to the preceding P15B frigates.

This substantial price hike has ignited discussions among defence analysts, with some comparing the cost to acquiring a larger number of Talwar-class frigates.

The specific configuration of the P17B frigates remains classified, but projections indicate a more robust armament package, potentially including at least 48 vertical launch cells capable of deploying long-range surface-to-air missiles (LRSAM) with ranges exceeding 250 kilometers.

The escalated cost can be attributed to several factors. The inclusion of advanced technologies and an expanded weapon load significantly contributes to the price.

Furthermore, the project encompasses the cost of base and depot spares for the ships' entire lifespan, estimated to be between 20 and 25 years, accounting for approximately 15-20% of the total project cost.

Despite the elevated price tag, the P17B frigates represent a critical upgrade for the Indian Navy's firepower and capabilities. By acquiring these ships, the Navy aims to sustain its dominance in the region and effectively respond to emerging threats.

 

[Ashish Sandhu]

If $1.19 billion is the cost of one frigate, then how much would be the cost of the research and development?

 

[Anant]

What is needed over and above the P-17As is an additional 4-8 ULVM VLS cells for anti-ship missiles, plus either another 32 VLS cells for SAMs, or 16 VLS cells for SAMs along with an increase in CIWS numbers.

We cannot, under any circumstances, continue to leave our ships underarmed. This is more of a problem for destroyers rather than frigates, though. The P-15A and P-15B need to get another 8 anti-ship missiles in either sloped launchers or VLS cells, plus a further 32-48 VLS cells for SAMs.

 

[Prit]

If $1.19 billion is the cost of one frigate, then how much would be the cost of the research and development?

The cost of research and development seems to be added in as it's whole cost of project. Things should get clearer with time.

 

[TSDP]

The suggestion that larger numbee of Talwar class frigates could have been order must be coming from the Russian lobby I am sure !

 

[desigandu]

What is needed over and above the P-17As is an additional 4-8 ULVM VLS cells for anti-ship missiles, plus either another 32 VLS cells for SAMs, or 16 VLS cells for SAMs along with an increase in CIWS numbers.

We cannot, under any circumstances, continue to leave our ships underarmed. This is more of a problem for destroyers rather than frigates, though. The P-15A and P-15B need to get another 8 anti-ship missiles in either sloped launchers or VLS cells, plus a further 32-48 VLS cells for SAMs.

1. How does the stealth, propulsion capability of these boats compare with best in class US, European or Chinese boats?
2. After 17B, what is plan - P19 or a follow on 17C?
Any thoughts!

 

[War is good for business]

A project 15C should have been considered with more armament. Now project 18 is not being laid down. For many years now we will not receive destroyers.

 

[Anant]

1. How does the stealth, propulsion capability of these boats compare with best in class US, European or Chinese boats?

Sir, will answer both your questions to the best of my ability in two separate replies, since they are varied.

Comparing the Nilgiri-class to contemporaries (since we don't quite know what exactly the P-17Bs will bring), let me take a few contemporaries: The Franco-Italian FREMM frigate, the Chinese Type 054B frigate, the American Constellation-class, the Anglo-Australian-Canadian Type 26, the Japanese Mogami-class, the German Sachsen-class, the Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class, the Russian Gorshkov-class, and the Spanish Alvaro da Bazan-class.

Within these, the Nilgiri-class is generally in the middle of the pack in terms of size, and operational characteristics such as speed, range, and endurance are also up to par.

Where the Nilgiri-class pulls ahead of the pack is that it is truly a multi-role frigate, and the ships are capable of some level of anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, fleet escort, and trade interdiction operations. Of the peers, only the FREMM and Gorshkov-classes possess similar capabilities, though those ships carry LWTs and are generally somewhat weaker in the ASW department unless you look at the FREMM-ASW variants, where they lack a bit in anti-surface operations.

However, in being a jack of all trades, the Nilgiri-class also suffers in not being optimally capable in any one role. Most frigates listed above either carry significant numbers of VLS cells for SAMs (going up as high as 64), or use the Mk 41 VLS with quad-packing SAMs, which increases their lethality that much. The Nilgiri-class is somewhat behind when it comes to these things.

In terms of sensor suites, almost all of the aforementioned ships come with AESA radars and other systems, and while a numerical comparison can theoretically be made, it wouldn't help. A similar story goes for stealth characteristics as well.

 

[Anant]

2. After 17B, what is plan - P19 or a follow on 17C?

For your second question, based on my reading of Indian naval thought and the naval strategy, there are two paths I think possible that the Navy may take. The first of these (Path A) involves the Navy getting massive levels of funding in the next two decades, and becoming a stand-alone force. The second path (Path B) is the more economical option, and means the Navy becomes a powerful force, albeit one that would also act in some form of supporting capacity in war, besides a reduced ambit of stand-alone operations.

I should preface what comes next with the disclaimer that no one can predict the future, let alone me. This is based on my understanding and analysis of Indian naval strategic thought. This will also be a very long comment, so shall use seperators (--------) to make it more readable.

That said, both options also mean that the Indian Navy will remain the undisputed master of the IOR short of someone like China or the USA deploying a permanent fleet.

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A small piece of advice: A lot of numbers will follow, so I would recommend taking a pen and paper or an Excel sheet and mapping these out for better understanding. Please also note that some of the older ships presently in service will not be included in the following numbers, as I assume they will be replaced by some of the ships planned hereafter.

1. Path A: This involves a force of five to six carriers besides around 8 SSBNs, 8 to 10 SSNs, 36 SSKs, and 100 surface combatants. These 100 combatants would comprise around 20 destroyers, 32 to 36 frigates, 14 to 18 anti-surface corvettes, and 30 ASW corvettes (18-20 coastal ASW corvettes plus 10-12 oceanic ASW corvettes).

2. Path B: This involves a fleet of three to four carriers besides 6 SSBNs, 6 to 8 SSNs, 28 to 30 SSKs, and 80 surface combatants. These surface combatants would comprise 16 destroyers, 28 to 30 frigates, 14 to 16 anti-surface corvettes, and 20 ASW corvettes (16 coastal ASW corvettes plus 4 oceanic ASW corvettes).

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Key to projects:

Destroyers:
P-15 is the Delhi-class.
P-15A is the Kolkata-class.
P-15B is the Visakhapatnam-class.
P-18 are the NGD.

Frigates:
P-16A is the Brahamputra-class.
P-17 is the Shivalik-class.
Talwar-class refers to the three Batch 2, two Batch 3, and two Batch 4 ships (7 in total, with the last four yet to be commissioned) unless stated otherwise.
P-17A is the Nilgiri-class.

Corvettes:
P-28 is the Kamorta-class.
ASW-SWC are the coastal ASW corvettes presently being built.
NGMV are the under-construction anti-surface corvettes, known as the Next-Generation Missile Vessels.
NGC is the planned Next-Generation Corvettes.

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That said, let's go further. I shall limit this to just the surface combatants. Let's first assume Path A is taken. Against that fleet build-up, we have 15 to 17 destroyers (3 P-15A + 4 P-15B + 8-10 P-18), 24 to 25 frigates (7 Talwar + 3 P-17 + 7 P-17A + 7-8 P-17B), 14 anti-surface corvettes (6 NGMV + 8 NGC), and 20 ASW corvettes (4 oceanic P-28 + 16 coastal ASW-SWC) corvettes present or on order or in the planning stage.

That leaves, within Path A, space for 3-5 destroyers, 8-12 frigates, 0-2 anti-surface corvettes, 2-4 coastal ASW corvettes, and 6-8 oceanic ASW corvettes. In this, I feel we may end up with a class of 5 mid-sized destroyers (similar to some upgunned P-15B variant, with 8 P-18s being built), a class of 4 large frigates (perhaps Project 17C), a class of 8 mid-sized frigates (perhaps Project 19), a class of 4 Batch 2 ASW-SWC coastal ASW corvettes, and a class of 8 new oceanic ASW corvettes. Procurement of anti-surface corvettes would stop at present levels. Later on, replacements of older ships (3 destroyers, 6 frigates, and 4 oceanic ASW corvettes would be followed by modified variants of earlier designs).

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Finally, we come to Path B. Assuming this is taken, we already have 15 to 17 destroyers (3 P-15A + 4 P-15B + 8-10 P-18), 24 to 25 frigates (7 Talwar + 3 P-17 + 7 P-17A + 7-8 P-17B), 14 anti-surface corvettes (6 NGMV + 8 NGC), and 20 ASW corvettes (4 oceanic P-28 and 16 coastal ASW-SWC) present, on order, or in planning. That means destroyers and corvettes are pretty much done for now.

That leaves us space for 4 to 6 frigates. In this scenario, I have a feeling that P-18 procurement may be limited to 9 ships (kind of 6 P-18 + 3 improved P-18). Furthermore, we may then see P-17B be restricted to 7 ships, with the Batch 1 Talwars and Project 16A (the Brahmaputra-class) frigates being replaced by a class of six mid-sized frigates. Again, when the time does come for the replacement of ships like the P-15A destroyers, Batch 2 Talwars, P-17 frigates (Shivalik-class), and others, we may well see some of those getting merged together (such as the P-15As and P-17s getting replaced by a class of mid-sized destroyers).

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Personally, I feel that given the prospects of increased defence spending over the next 20 years or so and a renewed focus on submarines, Path B would be more likely. Depending on how Indian shipyards and the economy performs, we may even see something between the two paths. Of course, there are literally hundreds of factors at play here, so saying anything for sure is impossible. This is just an estimate. Do let me know what you think.

 

[Anant]

A project 15C should have been considered with more armament. Now project 18 is not being laid down. For many years now we will not receive destroyers.

The RfI for P-18 should be out next year, which would allow for these ships to be commissioned starting 2033-35 or so. Till then, we have a number of corvettes and frigates to focus on, besides submarines.

 

[Frank]

Personally, I feel that given the prospects of increased defence spending over the next 20 years or so and a renewed focus on submarines, Path B would be more likely. Depending on how Indian shipyards and the economy performs, we may even see something between the two paths. Of course, there are literally hundreds of factors at play here, so saying anything for sure is impossible. This is just an estimate. Do let me know what you think.

We can go. More economical like Iran and Ukraine..

1) And build Boat drones...

2) And boat Submarines...

Literally killer machine with very low budget...

Pak have no defense for that..

And with large number it can bitter China to enter IOR

 

[desigandu]

Personally, I feel that given the prospects of increased defence spending over the next 20 years or so and a renewed focus on submarines, Path B would be more likely. Depending on how Indian shipyards and the economy performs, we may even see something between the two paths. Of course, there are literally hundreds of factors at play here, so saying anything for sure is impossible. This is just an estimate. Do let me know what you think.

Thanks - very informative Anant. I agree path B is more likely. Unless we have a formal NSS is place it is hard to speculate what successive governments may do or change course. At least now we have a naval focus which lacked during the first 50 years from independence.

Having said that at least the Navy has a plan and is working towards it. Ideally we need a force that can dominate IOR (red sea, near south africa to Choke points in the pacific) by having the capability to block SLOCs and take on the Chinese adventures in IOR. Will need 1. a larger fleet; 2. ability to project power with foreign bases; 3. a larger and more capable SSN/SSK fleet.

I agree on the numbers but also agree things are in flux and could change. I am not a war monger but believe in strong deterrence via strength and nothing better than a large and capable blue water navy at least in our area of IOR.

Any thoughts on how Plan B with time lines may come together in terms a carrier battle group in a 2 front skirmish created due to China blockading Taiwan, and India blocking SLOCs while Pakistan getting jumpy.

Thanks again. This is helpful.

 

[Anant]

We can go. More economical like Iran and Ukraine..

1) And build Boat drones...

2) And boat Submarines...

Literally killer machine with very low budget...

Pak have no defense for that..

And with large number it can bitter China to enter IOR

Yes, and no. On one hand, those assets are a massive boost for asymmetrical warfare. However, India's geo-strategic position is very different than that of Iran or Ukraine. Moreover, the threat faced by India is also far different.

The Black Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, while having large trade volumes flowing, are also very constrained localities, which makes sea control possible using small assets such as drones. The Indian Ocean, where we live, is a far larger and more open geographical location, and in order to disrupt any trade, we need a large force that can project and maintain power over the ocean.

That said, drones such as this are also a very important facet for us to explore and develop. However, instead of being independent systems, these would have to ideally be based off larger warships (such as some form of multi-mission bay on mid-sized frigates and auxiliaries hosting a bunch of drones).

 

[Anant]

Thanks - very informative Anant. I agree path B is more likely. Unless we have a formal NSS is place it is hard to speculate what successive governments may do or change course. At least now we have a naval focus which lacked during the first 50 years from independence.

Having said that at least the Navy has a plan and is working towards it. Ideally we need a force that can dominate IOR (red sea, near south africa to Choke points in the pacific) by having the capability to block SLOCs and take on the Chinese adventures in IOR. Will need 1. a larger fleet; 2. ability to project power with foreign bases; 3. a larger and more capable SSN/SSK fleet.

I agree on the numbers but also agree things are in flux and could change. I am not a war monger but believe in strong deterrence via strength and nothing better than a large and capable blue water navy at least in our area of IOR.

Any thoughts on how Plan B with time lines may come together in terms a carrier battle group in a 2 front skirmish created due to China blockading Taiwan, and India blocking SLOCs while Pakistan getting jumpy.

Thanks again. This is helpful.

Sir, while the naval strategy document has been published and is available online, it is an older version, and without a formal NSS, saying what path will be taken is not possible. That said, as you very rightfully pointed out, India at last seems to be looking outwards over the sea. I suppose Sh. K. M. Panikkar's vision is coming to light finally to some extent.

My assumption is that Path B, even despite being the more passive of the two, does have sufficient capabilities built within it to allow the Indian Navy to dominate the IOR, short of, of course, the PLAN or USN dropping a fleet or two, in which case, even the Path A fleet would struggle. Moreover, within Path B, one of my assumptions is that in case of a war with China, we would have alliances such as the Quad activated to some degree of military operations, or that we may have other South-East Asian nations joining in in some form of neutrality-focussed role (say, Brunei or Indonesia or the Philippines decides to conduct full-scale patrols within their EEZs and throw out China by force without actually attacking in international waters).

In order to combat China, though, we will need a strong submarine arm, which I have also tried to maintain some level of focus on in both Paths. In fact, in order to ensure that this comment didn't just become a full-scale article or mini-thesis with replacement schedules, capability projections, class size proposals, and the like (all of which I have tabulated and noted down based on my analyses), I had to keep carrier, submarine, and auxiliary ship programs out. I can probably post some of that online and link it on this forum if people want to have a read of a few pages of numbers and proposals.

In terms of carrier operations within Plan B, the way I see it, we would have three types of forces: Carrier battle groups (CBGs), surface task forces (STFs), and surface escort groups (SEGs).

CBGs would be the main power projection element, and four carriers would allow India to have atleast 3 CBGs. Of these, we would ideally have one aimed at Bhikaristan to keep them from trying any nonsense (with a SSBN or two joining in just to drive home the message), a second one in South East Asia providing support to trade flows and acting as an obstacle for Chinese offensives southward, with the third CBG being more in a flexible posture and serve where needed, be it opposing a Chinese blockade of Taiwan or shoring up defences for Japan or South Korea (not that those two nations would necessarily need more help), etc.

STFs would be, in essence, strike groups. These would have a number of large ships with concentrations of naval striking capabilities. These would have to be supported by land-based air power, or these could be attached to carriers / amphibious assault forces of India or any allies. Path B would give us 3 to 4 STFs. Of these, I would say one would be present against Bhikaristan, a second one based in the Eastern IOR to engage as necessary, a third one directly engaging in counter-actions against any Chinese moves, with the possible fourth STF being used as a large-scale escort force for our auxiliaries.

SEGs would be smaller groups of ships whose primary goals would be patrol and small-scale engagements. Path B would give us 5 to 6 SEGs. Of these, 1 would be based in the Western IOR, one around the Red Sea and Straits of Hormuz, a third in the Bay of Bengal (in a defensive role), a fourth one in the Arabian Sea (a backstop to the Bhikaristan-focussed CBG and STF), with the remaining 1 or 2 SEGs shoring up allied forces in South-East Asia or around Australia.

Besides these CBGs, STFs, and SEGs, we would also have some defensive forces. The sole role for these would be to defend Indian harbours and Indian waters, with practically no offensive action outside these limits.

 

[Frank]

Yes, and no. On one hand, those assets are a massive boost for asymmetrical warfare. However, India's geo-strategic position is very different than that of Iran or Ukraine. Moreover, the threat faced by India is also far different.

The Black Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, while having large trade volumes flowing, are also very constrained localities, which makes sea control possible using small assets such as drones. The Indian Ocean, where we live, is a far larger and more open geographical location, and in order to disrupt any trade, we need a large force that can project and maintain power over the ocean.

That said, drones such as this are also a very important facet for us to explore and develop. However, instead of being independent systems, these would have to ideally be based off larger warships (such as some form of multi-mission bay on mid-sized frigates and auxiliaries hosting a bunch of drones).

These armed boat drones, armed submarine drones are ideal against Pak.. We won't loose anything and destroy pak navy

Ukraine literally destroyed Russian black sea fleet with these..

Plus un armed version of these can also be used as saurvailence...

Like saurvailence drones..

 

[NSR]

It is surely expensive as I read recently that Indian Navy WDB is coming up with new generation of Destroyers and Frigates with 144 cells for land and ship attacks, air and missile defense, etc

More cells will naturally need more space and more missiles costs a lot of money.

Anyway, it is really worth for India to have these new generation of destroyers and frigates to fend off two enemies.

 

[MANIVANNAN N]

Navy always huge spender.

 

[Sandeep]

It’s not clear how much these ships will cost. It should be armed with more indigenous weapons, technology and equipment made in India. Crucial part is installing more missiles but I’m not sure how they will do that with the current size of the Nilgiri class of frigates.

I think we need to build much bigger frigates and destroyers as the threat level will only increase from China and its massive large naval expansion. We need to build them much quicker using the block assembling of prefabricated and build compartments from small, medium and large industries.

 

[Anant]

It’s not clear how much these ships will cost. It should be armed with more indigenous weapons, technology and equipment made in India. Crucial part is installing more missiles but I’m not sure how they will do that with the current size of the Nilgiri class of frigates.

I think we need to build much bigger frigates and destroyers as the threat level will only increase from China and its massive large naval expansion. We need to build them much quicker using the block assembling of prefabricated and build compartments from small, medium and large industries.

Rather than larger frigates, what we need are destroyers and frigates that are armed better. 32 SAMs on a 7,000+ ton destroyer is, frankly, shameful. Even the smaller Delhi-class destroyers and Talwar-class frigates are armed better in terms of defensive weaponry.

 

[linus52]

If $1.19 billion is the cost of one frigate, then how much would be the cost of the research and development?

All our PSU's know how to scheme our gov since we do not have private ship builders. They send false invoices plus don't build per spec and Babus enjoy Fat paychecks

 

[Sandeep]

Rather than larger frigates, what we need are destroyers and frigates that are armed better. 32 SAMs on a 7,000+ ton destroyer is, frankly, shameful. Even the smaller Delhi-class destroyers and Talwar-class frigates are armed better in terms of defensive weaponry.

Yes we need them to be better armed with more advanced capable missiles from SAM and surface to surface missiles. But with the current size of the frigates and destroyers that’s not possible as they need more room on the deck that are ready to fire straight away and more storage near the launchers so that they can easily reload them which takes time.

 

[Anant]

Yes we need them to be better armed with more advanced capable missiles from SAM and surface to surface missiles. But with the current size of the frigates and destroyers that’s not possible as they need more room on the deck that are ready to fire straight away and more storage near the launchers so that they can easily reload them which takes time.

If you have seen the photograph of Nilgiri trying out the RBU-6000 on her sea trials, there is plenty of deck space available. Of course, internal rearrangement would be needed if some VLS module was to be added in, but this could be done using a raised bulwark, assuming stability permits this.

Just going by deck space, the forward deck can easily accommodate another 4 VLS cells for the BrahMos as well as another 16 VLS cells for the Barak 8. Even that leaves a lot of space towards the sides, where slotting in VLS isn't feasible.

 

[Anant]

Navy always huge spender.

Ships aren't cheap, and for that spending, they actually have a pretty good force. That is more than what can be said for some other service.

Better to spend and see results than to act cheap and hope that someone will deliver on time.

 

[Param]

The cost escalation is also due to PSU inefficiencies. I have personally experienced the exorbitant charges that HAL levies for servicing of aircraft and components. The manpower keeps taking frequent breaks from work and then claim overtime by working extra hours.

 

[Sandeep]

If you have seen the photograph of Nilgiri trying out the RBU-6000 on her sea trials, there is plenty of deck space available. Of course, internal rearrangement would be needed if some VLS module was to be added in, but this could be done using a raised bulwark, assuming stability permits this.

Just going by deck space, the forward deck can easily accommodate another 4 VLS cells for the BrahMos as well as another 16 VLS cells for the Barak 8. Even that leaves a lot of space towards the sides, where slotting in VLS isn't feasible.

We can’t remove the RBU-6000 anti submarine rockets as that is a very important and crucial weapon that is the second best weapon and option to kill a submarine if your own torpedo or weapons aren’t effective or misses the submarine.

As for the current size of the frigate you might be able to increase the number of missiles it can hold by a little bit more. Currently we have only installed a total of 40 missiles launchers with 8 reserved for the Brahmos anti ship or land attack missile. The other 32 are reserved for the Barak 1 and 8 SAM to provide us with a multi layer air defence shield.

The only other way to increase the number of missiles is to develop the Brahmos NG. The missile has a shorter height, smaller width, lighter weight and if it has the same range or increased range and the same fast speed of Mach 3 or above then this will increase the amount of missile it can carry in current and future frigates. Also if we develop the VL-SRSAM and again it’s dimensions are smaller and lighter than the Barak 1 SAM then this will help to increase the number of missiles that we can deploy and use if it’s necessary.

 

[Anant]

We can’t remove the RBU-6000 anti submarine rockets as that is a very important and crucial weapon that is the second best weapon and option to kill a submarine if your own torpedo or weapons aren’t effective or misses the submarine.

As for the current size of the frigate you might be able to increase the number of missiles it can hold by a little bit more. Currently we have only installed a total of 40 missiles launchers with 8 reserved for the Brahmos anti ship or land attack missile. The other 32 are reserved for the Barak 1 and 8 SAM to provide us with a multi layer air defence shield.

The only other way to increase the number of missiles is to develop the Brahmos NG. The missile has a shorter height, smaller width, lighter weight and if it has the same range or increased range and the same fast speed of Mach 3 or above then this will increase the amount of missile it can carry in current and future frigates. Also if we develop the VL-SRSAM and again it’s dimensions are smaller and lighter than the Barak 1 SAM then this will help to increase the number of missiles that we can deploy and use if it’s necessary.

I have a feeling that the VL-SRSAM, once operationalised, can be added to our destroyers and frigates, with each of the larger ships receiving 32 VLS cells for these. For the P-15 destroyers and P-17 frigates, as well as on the Talwar-class frigates, we can replace the Shtil SAM arm launchers with a 24-cell VLS for the VL-SRSAM.

Also, my apologies for an error in my earlier comment. I meant there is enough space to add in another 32 VLS cells for SAMs, not specifically Barak 8s.

 

[bks78]

Research and development always cost more and should be kept separate. We have two options, buy every weapon like middle east countries do or spend in R&D develop your own. Congress followed first and BJP followed second.

 

[Sandeep]

I have a feeling that the VL-SRSAM, once operationalised, can be added to our destroyers and frigates, with each of the larger ships receiving 32 VLS cells for these. For the P-15 destroyers and P-17 frigates, as well as on the Talwar-class frigates, we can replace the Shtil SAM arm launchers with a 24-cell VLS for the VL-SRSAM.

Also, my apologies for an error in my earlier comment. I meant there is enough space to add in another 32 VLS cells for SAMs, not specifically Barak 8s.

Yes we can definitely replace the Barak 1 and Shtil SAM with our indigenous VL-SRSAM which is better because it will cut down on expensive imports at the very least. The main question is whether our indigenous VL-SRSAM dimensions are small enough that it allows us to carry more than the current installed capacity of 40 SAM missiles or surface to surface missiles. Hopefully they should be able to do that.

 

[Amitsolanki]

I think india need to include blockchain integration in defence to make it immutable.
Layer 1 indian blockchain i.e. JaiHo blockchain can be trusted.

 

[Anant]

These armed boat drones, armed submarine drones are ideal against Pak.. We won't loose anything and destroy pak navy

Ukraine literally destroyed Russian black sea fleet with these..

Plus un armed version of these can also be used as saurvailence...

Like saurvailence drones..

Again, drones are necessary, but they aren't sufficient. What you are suggesting, Sir, is something akin to the Jeune Ecole doctrine. Please have a look at that if you are unaware what that is.

Small ships capable of potentially outsized impact are important, but in open seas, such ships aren't enough to maintain control of the seas.