Fifteen years after the initial concept was introduced, the Indian Army's Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) program is stalled due to the absence of the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR). The GSQR is a crucial document that details the tank's required specifications.
The FMBT was designed to replace the aging fleet of Soviet-era T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), modernizing India's armored capabilities. The continued delays in finalizing these requirements have brought the project to a standstill, raising concerns about the Army's future combat readiness.
The FMBT program began in 2010, spurred by the successful comparative trials of the indigenous Arjun Mk1 tank against the Russian T-90. Following this, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) proposed developing a new, advanced tank to replace the T-72s, which have formed the core of India's armored forces since the 1980s.
The Indian Army currently operates approximately 2,400 T-72 tanks. Many of these have surpassed their 30-year operational lifespan, becoming increasingly outdated for the demands of modern combat. The FMBT was intended to overcome these limitations with features like active protection systems, improved mobility, and network-centric warfare capabilities.
The initial stages of the program showed promise. In December 2010, then-Defence Minister A.K. Antony stated in the Lok Sabha that the Army had created the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements (PSQR) for the FMBT. The DRDO was assigned to conduct a feasibility study.
The PSQR provides a general outline of desired capabilities. It is meant to be followed by the GSQR, which specifies precise technical and operational parameters. The approval of GSQR is important as it is required to unlock funding and establish development timelines.
Initial plans projected the completion of development by 2020, with production to take place at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Avadi. However, as of March 2025, the GSQR has not been released.
As early as 2012, reports indicated internal disagreement within the Army regarding key design aspects, such as the crew size (three or four personnel). This indecision prevented the refinement of the PSQR into a functional GSQR, hindering progress.
DRDO officials have consistently maintained that without the GSQR, they cannot finalize the design or proceed beyond the conceptual phase. A senior DRDO official stated in 2011, "The Army's technological and combat wish list is essential to kick-start development," a statement that remains relevant today.
The delay is especially critical considering the condition of the existing T-72 fleet. It's projected that over 50% of these tanks will be retired or placed in storage within the next 7-8 years due to reaching the end of their mechanical lifespan.
While some T-72s (over 1,200) have undergone upgrades, including new engines and fire control systems, these upgrades are not sufficient to address all vulnerabilities.
The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has also created challenges for maintenance, disrupting the supply of spare parts and highlighting the T-72's limitations against modern anti-tank weapons, such as drones and guided missiles.
India's armored forces, once a significant strength, are now at risk of lagging behind regional counterparts. Pakistan utilizes a combination of Chinese and domestically produced tanks, and China's Type 99 and Type 15 tanks represent advanced technological capabilities.
Without a modern replacement, India's defensive capabilities along its disputed borders could be compromised, a concern heightened by ongoing tensions in regions like eastern Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir.
The FMBT's lack of progress is further complicated by the Army's concurrent pursuit of the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) program. Initiated in 2015 with a Request for Information (RFI), the FRCV program seeks to acquire 1,770 advanced tanks to replace the T-72s, potentially overshadowing the DRDO-led FMBT project.
Unlike the indigenous FMBT, the FRCV is planned to involve collaboration with international manufacturers under the Strategic Partnership model, with a target induction date of 2030. However, the FRCV has also encountered difficulties, including a previous RFI cancellation and an expanded project scope now encompassing multiple vehicle types, adding further uncertainty.
Defense analysts suggest that the Army's indecisiveness reflects a lack of a clear, long-term strategy for its armored forces. One analyst commented, "The FMBT could have built on the Arjun’s foundation, but instead, we’re chasing multiple tracks without committing to any."
The Arjun Mk1A, an improved version with 118 units currently ordered, has shown promise, but the Army has limited its acquisition to a small portion of its total tank fleet, prioritizing Russian T-90s and, more recently, the FRCV.
The FMBT was originally envisioned as a 50-tonne tank equipped with a 120mm smoothbore gun, active protection systems to defend against incoming projectiles, and a 1,500 hp indigenously developed engine (the Bharat Power Pack).
Its modular design was intended to allow for future upgrades, and features like CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) protection and network-centric capabilities were planned to ensure its readiness for modern warfare.
The estimated development cost was ₹5,000 crore (approximately $1.2 billion USD in 2010), with each tank costing around ₹25 crore – a substantial investment in India's defense self-reliance.
However, without the GSQR, this remains a hypothetical plan. The DRDO's Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) in Chennai is prepared to lead the project, but the lack of direction from the Army has left it inactive. The FRCV's international focus may potentially overshadow indigenous initiatives, possibly relegating the FMBT to a minor role.
The Indian Army is at a crucial decision point. With the impending retirement of the T-72s, it must choose whether to revitalize the FMBT by issuing a definitive GSQR, fully commit to the FRCV, or adopt a hybrid approach that combines DRDO's expertise with international collaboration.
Each year of delay increases the capability gap, putting pressure on an armored fleet that is already under strain. The decision made will significantly impact India's defense capabilities and its strategic posture in the region for decades to come.
