India’s ambitious Project 75I was originally envisioned as the natural successor to the Scorpène-class submarines currently being constructed at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) under Project 75.
The blueprint was logical: six advanced conventional submarines, manufactured in India with increased indigenous content, Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) capabilities, and a seamless technological bridge to the future Project-76 programme.
However, recent developments indicate that the Ministry of Defence is pivoting towards the German Type 214/NG from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), a move that experts warn could inadvertently dismantle the specialized industrial ecosystem established over the last two decades.
The "Factory Reset" Dilemma
While the shift may appear to be a standard procurement decision on paper, industry insiders describe it as a logistical upheaval.The situation is comparable to a car factory that has spent years perfecting the production of a specific model, only to be told to manufacture a completely different vehicle from a rival brand on the same assembly line.
Such a transition is not merely about changing blueprints; it fundamentally alters the manufacturing DNA. The steel chemistry, welding protocols, section-joining philosophies, quality assurance frameworks, and tooling requirements would all need to be overhauled.
Most critically, the human expertise nurtured over 15 years would face a sudden reset.
Incompatible Steel and Welding Standards
The core of the incompatibility lies in the metallurgy. The current Scorpène-class boats are constructed using French-specification HY-80 and HY-100 high-yield steels, procured and processed under strict Naval Group licenses.MDL’s workforce has spent years mastering the specific preheat temperatures, interpass thermal controls, and post-weld heat treatment regimes required for these materials.
In contrast, the German Type 214SG—derived from the Type 214/216 family—utilises a distinct grade of high-strength steel, likely an HY-100 equivalent from different European mills.
Crucially, it employs proprietary welding consumables and non-destructive testing standards that are not interchangeable with French norms.
Consequently, the qualified welding procedure specifications (WPS) currently in place at MDL would be rendered obsolete. Every destructive test coupon and procedural certification from the Scorpène era would essentially become invalid.
Structural Design Differences
The divergence extends to the structural philosophy of the submarines.The Scorpène class utilises a "ring-stiffened" construction method, where large, pre-outfitted sections are joined by circumferential welds. This methodology dictates everything from damage repair doctrine to the essential docking repair procedures used at Naval Dockyards.
German submarines of the 214/216/218 family, however, follow an evolution of the classic Krupp design, featuring a "cylindrical with conical end" shape supported by longitudinal stringers.
This represents a fundamentally different approach to damage control and section replacement. Adopting this design would necessitate the redevelopment of repair procedures, alignment jigs, and hydraulic pressing tools from scratch.
The Human and Logistic Cost
Perhaps the most significant loss would be in human capital.MDL currently boasts a workforce of over 800 welders, fitters, and engineers who are qualified to French Bureau Veritas and Naval Group standards for high-pressure hull fabrication.
Switching to the TKMS platform would mean discarding this corporate knowledge. The shipyard would be forced to initiate a new, multi-year training and qualification cycle under Germanischer Lloyd or DNV-GL rules.
This is not a minor refresher course; every automatic welding machine operator, Level-II non-destructive testing technician, and quality assurance inspector would require re-certification.
Analysts estimate this could delay the laying down of the first Indian-built Type 214 pressure hull by 42 to 60 months.
Furthermore, the Indian Navy would be left managing two incompatible logistics chains for its frontline conventional submarine fleet.
Spare pressure-hull sections stockpiled for the Scorpène would be unusable for the German boats, and vice versa, creating a long-term maintenance nightmare.
Strategic Implications for Project-76
The decision also holds serious implications for India’s long-term strategic goals.The original Naval Group proposal for P75I included a 60 per cent technology transfer, co-development of an indigenous AIP module with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and a commitment to support the manufacturing of the next three nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) using the existing hull fabrication philosophy.
By opting for the German platform, India risks severing this continuum, potentially pushing the indigenous SSN programme back by at least eight years.
Instead of saving money, the selection of the Type 214 could cost the exchequer an additional ₹18,000–₹22,000 crore in duplicated infrastructure and training costs.
Ultimately, sticking with a Scorpène-derived platform for P75I would have provided the Indian Navy with a fleet of 12 submarines sharing over 70 per cent commonality, a mature local supply chain, and a direct path to nuclear propulsion.
Switching to Germany now is not simply choosing a different submarine; it is a choice to tear down a functioning factory to build a new one on the same land, pretending the previous decade of industrial progress never happened.
