India's $7B AMCA Engine Deal with SAFRAN Ignites Fierce Debate on French Firm's Historical Tech-Sharing Failures

Recent reports of a potential agreement valued at approximately $7 billion (around ₹61,000 crore) between India and French aerospace leader SAFRAN has sparked a significant debate within the nation's defence community.

The deal focuses on the joint development of a powerful new jet engine for India's Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth-generation stealth fighter program.

While the partnership is being hailed as a major step towards modernising the Indian Air Force, it has also revived concerns over SAFRAN's past record on technology transfer.

Proponents of the deal point to the long and generally successful partnership between SAFRAN and India's state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This collaboration has been vital for India's helicopter fleet.

The Shakti engine, co-developed by the two firms, is the proven powerplant for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH-Dhruv), the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), and the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).

Having produced over 350 units in Bengaluru, the engine has demonstrated its reliability in extreme conditions, from the high altitudes of the Himalayas to maritime environments.

This established trust is a key reason SAFRAN is seen as a dependable partner for the ambitious AMCA project.

However, a cloud of scepticism hangs over the agreement, stemming from SAFRAN's past performance on technology sharing. Critics highlight that the transfer of technology (ToT) for the very same Shakti engine was reportedly delayed by nearly two decades.

This delay hampered HAL's ability to produce and maintain the engines independently, leading to continued reliance on imported components, which increased both costs and logistical challenges for India's defence forces.

This history has made many experts cautious, questioning whether the new promises of full technology sharing will be fulfilled in a timely manner.

The debate is deeply connected to India's overarching national policy of "Aatmanirbhar Bharat," or a self-reliant India. The nation's past struggles with developing its own jet engine, most notably the indigenous Kaveri engine program, have created wariness about becoming overly dependent on foreign partners for critical defence technology.

The AMCA is a flagship program for India's aerospace ambitions, and any restrictions or delays in engine technology could critically undermine the ability of the DRDO's Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to build a self-sustaining engine manufacturing ecosystem.

Supporters of the deal argue that the current terms directly address these historical concerns. The agreement for the new 120-kilonewton (kN) thrust engine reportedly includes the complete transfer of technology and, crucially, full intellectual property rights (IPR).

Granting India IPR would be a significant milestone, allowing the country to not only manufacture the engines domestically but also to modify, upgrade, and potentially export them in the future without foreign oversight.

This is seen as a genuine opportunity for India to become a global hub for advanced jet engine production.

The sheer scale of SAFRAN's involvement in India's military aviation underscores the importance of this deal. Beyond the AMCA, the co-developed engine technology is expected to be adapted for other platforms.

There is a projected demand for nearly 400 engines for the LUH and LCH fleets, in addition to future orders for 200 ALH-Dhruv helicopters and 400 units of the new Indian Multi-Role Helicopter (IMRH).

This extensive requirement makes a robust and complete technology transfer essential for cost-effective manufacturing and long-term operational readiness.

Ultimately, the SAFRAN partnership represents a critical balancing act for India—leveraging essential foreign expertise while vigorously pursuing the goal of self-reliance.

While the French firm's commitment to full technology transfer and IPR for the AMCA program is a source of confidence, the defence community remains watchful.

The success of this multi-billion dollar venture will depend entirely on SAFRAN's ability to deliver on its promises, which could finally enable India to achieve its long-held ambition of mastering jet engine technology.

 

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[P.K Senapati]

The arguments will continue in favour as well as against. But do not waste time and go ahead in full strength. Complete the certification in time.

 

[Sparkle Studio]

Did SAFRAN assist in fixing the ALH Dhruv engine that grounded the Naval and Coast Guard helicopters? We still have no updates on the repairs or when the helicopters will resume flying.

 

[sandy 007]

Yes, I doubt Safran will manufacture hot core section critical components in Bharat. Most likely, it will manufacture these critical components in France and supply them to GTRE, and will hold some critical components manufacturing at Safran's plant engine division. Safran has also established its engine manufacturing components plant in Hyderabad.

Even if it is manufactured in Bharat, it will be manufactured in Safran's Hyderabad plant, and it's likely they will keep control of these components. What is needed is manufacturing all components from the prototype of the engine in Bharat by local private vendors, instead of manufacturing in France. The same prototype engine should be tested this way. The ecosystem will get developed by the time the engine is certified and enters production.

Mark my words, Safran will hold some critical components of the hot core section and will not share ToT. I even doubt Safran will retain joint IPR for the engine and even royalties for the export of the engine. The question is, the project cost is ₹61,000 crore. If all the cost is going to be paid by Bharat, then why does Safran want conditions? They are just consultants; they will be paid their fee for the development of their work share. France is likely to use this tech developed from the AMCA Engine project for the FCAS program.

Yes, you are right. France, concerning the German submarine ToT with India, was advocating all European nations not to transfer the technology to anyone. How is the Indian government and MOD so confident about the jet engine technology transfer?

I think this decision may suffer a lot because France may use this money to make its own sixth-generation jet engine, and India may remain just a funding nation in the future. Also, France may ask for more money for the engine in the future.

Secondly, I knew that initially, when the Kaveri engine was made, Safran was asking for another one billion dollar in funds to revive the Kaveri engine, and later on, during Rafale procurements, they helped a little bit on Kaveri engine checks or gave consultations. So I think India needs to be cautious in its approach and needs to release the funds on a parts basis. Like when one section is completed, then release the funds; otherwise, DRDO will be just a financier, not more than this.

 

[coke]

US managed to get Japan to ditch its fighter jet programmes even for its own military. So do you really think Japan was the right choice? In fact, even after Parrikar ji requested Japan for the submarine deal, they refused to even participate. And of course, they haven't made any operational jet engine till now so doubts would persist.

They did right by refusing to participate in the sub deal, citing retired traitors in the Navy who would leak all data, like they did for the development of South Korean subs. Better we clean our home first.

 

[DDzz136871]

If the government is going to spend 61,000 crore for an advanced-generation jet engine, then it should choose Rolls-Royce with full IP rights. HAL has chosen Safran for co-developing engines for helicopters. India shouldn't put all its eggs in one basket. The government should make an exception and choose Rolls-Royce for co-developing these engines with the IP rights, so that India can export engines to other friendly countries. India should hold full IP rights.

 

[Kira]

I preferred RR, as they have better jet engine technology as compared to Safran, plus Safran did not provide the needed support to GTRE after the 2015 deal.

 

[Jon Arts]

The agreement should be properly phased per year, and money should only be released according to progress. In case of delays, charges should be levied, and everything should be done in India within an allotted timeframe. Alternatively, GTRE should work alongside another 80KN Kaveri 2.0 engine project with an Indian company.

 

[Sandeep]

India needs to create a legally binding contract which clearly states that we get 100% of the technology, manufacture it entirely in India and from local raw materials, own the IPR and make any changes or upgrades. As long as it’s clearly written down then there’s nothing that France can do to avoid it. We just need to make sure that we develop it.

 

[bhanu prakash]

Indian partner should be a private company or group of private companies. PSUs and government employees of GTRE and HAL are inefficient, with zero innovation, and they also have no incentive to work harder as they get the same salary as zero-effort employees or high-performing engineers. Promotion is based on seniority instead of impact and performance.

No extra bonuses for high-performing teams and managers. Same low government salary with job security, and they earn cash by corruption. Why will any talented engineers work for HAL or GTRE?

We need to develop a private military-industrial complex with good competition of various firms in every field: Naval, Aerospace, Land-based, etc.

Privatisation of HAL will be a very good thing in the long run; in the next 20-25 years, it will be one of the best engine and fighter jet manufacturers if privatized today.

 

[King]

RR were better for the deal as they had 100x better experience. I guess Brits being USA police dogs affected the GOI decision; that's the only reason I can think of. Still, reconsider putting all eggs in one basket as Safran might backstab India like the Kaveri deal post-2015. The EU (France is a part of it) put sanctions against India. Sorry, Brits are not part of the EU. GOI official babus might have had a good French fry and croissant, otherwise, no wonder unreliable Safran got the whole deal and co-development.

 

[G R]

Danger in RR proposal is that American components and their influence comes with it. Hence RR is to be accepted only if everything that is hardware and software is manufactured in India without reservations.

Other than joint projects like the F-35, Rolls-Royce military engines are designed to be ITAR-free so that the Eurofighter can be sold without US approval, so that isn't generally true, at least where military engines are concerned.

 

[AK S]

That is always the case. But problem is GTRE. They can't absorb the tech even if given on a silver platter.

The problem is the level of ToT and localisation of the entire vendor ecosystem in India, which means nothing comes from outside India. This is much harder to come by. There is a litany of broken promises. Safran and Dassault are no exceptions; they are known for signing contracts, overcharging, and yet reneging on their ToT promises.

 

[AK S]

Past experience shows that they will strictly stick to the contract document. If they give it in writing, they will do it. So this one depends on our lawyers as much as our scientists. Make a water tight agreement with no ambiguities. If they sign that agreement, we can relax. Unlike Russia and US, France always sticks to the written words.

LOL … we know clearly what happened to the French offset obligations in Rafale deal. Encashing EMDs is all MoD can resort to. It’s long list of broken promises. That’s the reason additional Rafales are taking so long. Decision makers are extra cautious about the engine deal and it’s not inked as yet.

We know 100% tech won’t be in our hands … we have to make best use of what we can get.

Parallelly we must work on AL51 and it’s derivative. They are using variable cycles to control the bypass ratio. Just that they are still not ready for production. It’s only few Su57 flying using AL51.

 

[sanjiv]

Better off to join Japan, Italy, and UK in their sixth-generation fighter and learn from it and produce an indigenous engine. This way, we will have strategic partners. As for France, involve them in intermediate heavy helicopter engine design. In the meantime, buy F-35 x 36 + Su-57 x 108 to compensate for fighters up to 2030 until the sixth generation and AMCA mature.

 

[Krishnendu Chatterjee]

France has not proved a reliable partner in the past. Dassault did not fulfill the conditions of the "offset clause" in the Rafale deal. Moreover, GE still has a partnership with Safran and holds IPR over some Snecma tech related to super-alloy. Safran did not help much in troubleshooting Kaveri, maybe under pressure from GE. As you have pointed out, France needs our money to fund the European 'Tempest' project. Safran's CFM-56 engine, the workhorse of Airbus A380, also has components from GE. GE will surely scuttle our project.

Committing ₹61,000 crore over a period of 12-15 years will not be wise.