In the late 1990s, India's Air Force (IAF) embarked on a mission to bolster its fighter jet fleet with the Mirage 2000-5, an upgraded version of the Mirage 2000H, which had excelled during the Kargil War.
However, bureaucratic hurdles and cost concerns stymied this endeavor, leading to a protracted procurement process and ultimately a more expensive outcome for the nation.
The IAF's preference for the Mirage 2000-5 was based on its proven capabilities and the potential for local production through Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
The proposed deal aimed to acquire a combination of fly-away and locally manufactured units. However, the Indian bureaucracy insisted on a wider tender process, citing concerns over the unit cost of the Mirage 2000-5, estimated to be between $73 million and $80 million per unit.
This cost was considerably higher than the original Mirage 2000H, acquired at around $40 million per unit. The bureaucratic emphasis on a competitive tender aimed to explore potentially cheaper alternatives, leading to the formulation of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) tender.
This broader approach, while intended to be cost-effective, resulted in significant delays and a prolonged evaluation process. Ironically, the eventual selection of the Rafale fighter jet in 2016 came at a per-unit cost nearly double that of the Mirage 2000-5 proposed in the early 2000s.
Open-source information confirms that the MiG-29A, offered by the Soviet Union at a substantially lower cost, played a role in influencing the decision-making process. The MiG-29A's unit cost of $20 million appealed to both the IAF and Indian bureaucrats, leading to the abandonment of the initial Mirage 2000H procurement plans.
The Mirage 2000-5 saga underscores the complexities of defence procurement in India. While the bureaucratic intent was to secure a cost-effective solution, the emphasis on short-term savings potentially led to a more expensive outcome in the long run.
The IAF's vision for a robust domestic fighter jet fleet through the Mirage 2000-5 upgrade was sacrificed, raising questions about the effectiveness of procurement processes that prioritize immediate cost considerations over long-term strategic advantages.
The current scenario, with India operating the Rafale at a significantly higher cost, highlights the unintended consequences of bureaucratic decisions. The Mirage 2000-5, had it been acquired in the early 2000s, could have potentially offered a more affordable and capable solution for the IAF.
This situation serves as a cautionary tale about the importance of balancing cost considerations with long-term strategic objectives in defence procurement.
