New projections from the United States indicate a rapid expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, potentially reaching 1,500 warheads by 2035. This substantial growth raises serious concerns about the balance of power in Asia, particularly for India's nuclear deterrent.
Current U.S. estimates put China's nuclear stockpile at approximately 600 warheads in 2025, growing to 1,000 by 2030. The 2035 projection of 1,500 warheads represents a significant and sustained build-up. This expansion is part of a broader Chinese military modernization effort aimed at projecting greater global influence.
In contrast, India's nuclear arsenal is considerably smaller, estimated at around 172 warheads. Furthermore, the explosive power, or yield, of India's weapons is significantly lower than that of China's. This disparity creates a growing imbalance that could challenge India's ability to deter a potential nuclear threat.
China's nuclear development has accelerated significantly in the last ten years. The current estimate of 600 warheads includes a variety of explosive yields, ranging from 425 kilotons up to multiple megatons (a megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT). This indicates China is developing both tactical nuclear weapons (for battlefield use) and strategic weapons (for targeting cities or large military installations).
The projected increase to 1,500 warheads by 2035 is accompanied by improvements in China's delivery systems. China is modernizing its "nuclear triad," which consists of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like the DF-41, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) like the JL-3, and strategic bombers like the H-20, which is under development. This variety allows China to launch nuclear strikes from multiple platforms, increasing the survivability of its arsenal.
India's nuclear arsenal, on the other hand, is believed to be around 172 warheads. The yield of Indian nuclear weapons is also lower, with estimates suggesting yields starting at 20 kilotons, and even boosted-fission designs producing less than 40 kilotons. While adequate for limited tactical strikes, these weapons lack the destructive power of China's larger-yield warheads. India's nuclear weapons program has historically emphasized a "minimum credible deterrence" doctrine.
Historically, India's nuclear stockpile was smaller than that of Pakistan. While recent data suggests India may now possess slightly more warheads than Pakistan, the growing gap with China remains a major strategic concern. India's "No First Use" (NFU) policy means it pledges to only use nuclear weapons in retaliation. This policy, coupled with minimum credible deterrence, has focused on ensuring the survivability of India's nuclear forces rather than a massive build-up.
The projected tripling of China's arsenal by 2035 directly threatens India's second-strike capability. A second-strike capability is the ability to retaliate effectively after absorbing a nuclear attack. This is the core of deterrence – the idea that an enemy won't attack if they know they will face devastating retaliation. With a much larger and more diversified Chinese arsenal, India's smaller force could be vulnerable in a conflict.
India's current warheads, with their lower yields, might struggle to inflict sufficient damage on a heavily armed China, particularly if China disperses its forces or uses missile defence systems. The difference in yields is significant: a single Chinese multi-megaton warhead could devastate an Indian city, while India would need multiple, accurate strikes with its lower-yield weapons to achieve the same level of damage.
To maintain a credible second-strike capability against a projected 1,500-warhead Chinese arsenal, some analysts suggest India might need to significantly increase its own stockpile, potentially to around 500 warheads. This estimate is based on the need to have enough surviving warheads after a potential first strike to inflict unacceptable damage on China's key assets.
However, simply increasing numbers isn't enough; India would likely also need to develop warheads with higher yields, possibly in the 100-200 kiloton range, to be more comparable to China's strategic weapons.
Beyond increasing warhead numbers, India needs to improve its delivery systems. India currently relies on land-based Agni missiles (with a maximum range of around 5,000 km), submarine-launched K-series missiles (like the K-4, with a range up to 3,500 km), and aircraft like the Mirage 2000 and Rafale carrying gravity bombs. These systems face limitations in range, number, and survivability compared to China's evolving arsenal.
India's cautious approach to nuclear expansion is driven by several factors: strategic doctrine, economic constraints, and political considerations. The NFU policy and minimum deterrence doctrine are intended to avoid an arms race, prioritizing economic development and conventional military strength. However, China's projected growth may necessitate a re-evaluation of this stance.
Expanding India's nuclear arsenal and increasing yields would require substantial investment in producing fissile material, testing facilities, and delivery systems. These costs compete with other critical national needs, such as healthcare and infrastructure. India also faces international pressure to limit nuclear proliferation, even though it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
