The Indian Army and Air Force's ambitious plans to replace their aging fleet of Cheetah and Chetak helicopters with the indigenously developed Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) have hit a snag.
Procurement delays, attributed to a combination of technical challenges and disagreements over specifications, are expected to push back the delivery of the initial batch of LUHs by 18-24 months.
The first six Limited Series Production (LSP) LUHs, crucial for user trials and feedback, were initially slated for delivery in August 2022. However, due to a disagreement over the inclusion of an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), requested by the Army but not included in the original specifications, the delivery is now anticipated between December 2024 and June 2025. This additional requirement necessitates further testing and certification, contributing to the delay.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the manufacturer of the LUH, has also encountered minor technical issues during the development of the prototypes, which are currently being addressed. Even after the LSP deliveries, obtaining user clearance from the Army, which is leading the acquisition of 250 LUHs, could take nearly a year.
The LUHs are intended for reconnaissance and light cargo missions, and their delayed induction poses a challenge for the armed forces as they grapple with the retirement of their existing light utility helicopters.
The overall procurement plan involves acquiring 400 LUHs for both the Army and Air Force. However, the delays in the LUH program might necessitate a reevaluation of the additional procurement of 200 Kamov Ka-226T helicopters.
The Ka-226T, a twin-engine helicopter offering enhanced safety features, faces its own set of challenges due to Western sanctions on Russia and the exclusion of the French engine from the Transfer of Technology (ToT) offered to HAL.
While the LUH offers a promising indigenous solution for replacing the aging helicopter fleet, the extended wait time necessitates a careful assessment of operational requirements and potential alternatives to ensure the Indian Armed Forces maintain their operational readiness.
