The Indian Air Force (IAF) is reportedly experiencing a decline in confidence in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the government-owned aerospace company responsible for manufacturing fighter jets to enhance India's aerial defense capabilities.
This growing distrust stems from ongoing production delays, concerns about manufacturing quality, and HAL's difficulty in meeting the IAF's operational deadlines. These problems are jeopardizing India's defense readiness, particularly in light of increased regional tensions.
The dwindling number of active IAF squadrons, combined with setbacks in domestic programs like the Tejas light combat aircraft, highlights the critical importance of this situation for India's aerospace sector.
Experts and industry analysts are urging immediate intervention from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to implement comprehensive reforms at HAL. This intervention is deemed necessary to ensure the company is capable of fulfilling the nation's strategic goals under the "Make in India" and "Aatmanirbhar Bharat" (self-reliant India) initiatives.
For many decades, HAL has served as the IAF's main provider of fighter aircraft. The company has delivered platforms such as the MiG-21, Jaguar, and Su-30 MKI, manufactured under license from foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). HAL is also responsible for the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas.
However, recent events indicate a growing strain in the relationship. The IAF currently operates with only 31 squadrons, significantly below its authorized strength of 42.5. To address this shortfall, the IAF depends on HAL to deliver Tejas Mk-1A jets and future variants, including the Mk-2 and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), in a timely manner. HAL's past performance, however, has caused significant concern.
The Tejas Mk-1A program, a crucial element of India's efforts to develop a domestic fighter jet, exemplifies these concerns. In February 2021, the Cabinet Committee on Security authorized a contract worth Rs 48,000 crore (approximately USD 5.8 Billion) for 83 Mk-1A jets, with deliveries originally scheduled to commence in March 2024. However, as of March 2025, only a handful of aircraft have been delivered
HAL has attributed these delays to disruptions in the supply chain, challenges integrating the EL/M-2052 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, and difficulties in increasing production beyond its current capacity of eight jets per year.
The IAF, facing the retirement of its aging MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets, had anticipated a production rate of 16 to 20 jets annually – a target HAL has consistently failed to achieve. This has led the Air Force to consider acquiring foreign aircraft, such as the Rafale, and to re-evaluate its reliance on domestic production.
Beyond the issue of delays, significant concerns regarding quality have further eroded the IAF's confidence. Reports, including those circulating on social media platform X, from early 2025 indicate that Tejas aircraft have experienced technical malfunctions during trials. These incidents have raised serious questions about HAL's quality control procedures.
A senior IAF official, speaking anonymously to The Hindu, stated that the Air Force "cannot afford to induct aircraft that need constant troubleshooting when we're already stretched thin."
This sentiment echoes previous criticisms, including a 2016 report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on the Su-30 MKI. The CAG report found that HAL-assembled jets exhibited lower reliability compared to those imported directly from Russia, due to inconsistencies in the manufacturing process.
The declining trust in HAL is not merely a logistical problem; it represents a significant strategic challenge. India's defense strategy relies heavily on achieving self-reliance to effectively counter potential threats from neighboring countries, such as China and Pakistan, both of which possess modern air forces.
The Tejas Mk-1A, with its 4.5-generation capabilities, is intended to replace older MiG aircraft and supplement the Su-30 and Rafale fleets. The development of the more advanced Mk-2 and the stealth AMCA are also crucial for maintaining a credible future deterrent. However, HAL's slow progress – with the Mk-2's first flight postponed to 2027 and the AMCA's to 2032 – puts these objectives at risk.
This diminishing confidence has the potential to disrupt the "Make in India" initiative. While private sector companies like Tata Advanced Systems and Kalyani Group are increasingly involved in aerospace manufacturing (supplying components like C295 airframes and Airbus landing gears), HAL remains the key player in fighter jet production.
If the IAF is compelled to rely on imports, as demonstrated by the 2016 acquisition of 36 Rafale jets, India's indigenous aerospace industry could suffer, negating decades of investment in organizations like the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and HAL itself.
The gravity of the situation necessitates immediate and decisive action. Experts are calling for the PMO, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, to intervene and mandate substantial reforms at HAL. These recommended reforms include:
- Leadership Changes: The appointment of a Chairman with a strong technical background and proven experience in the aerospace industry, replacing the current leadership structure, to foster greater accountability and innovation.
- Increased Production Capacity: Expanding HAL's manufacturing facilities beyond the existing sites in Bengaluru and Nashik, and collaborating with private sector companies to achieve an annual production rate of at least 20 jets. This would bring HAL closer to the production benchmarks of international manufacturers, such as Dassault Aviation's Rafale production line.
- Enhanced Quality Control: The establishment of an independent oversight body, potentially under the authority of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), to rigorously audit HAL's manufacturing processes and ensure they meet the IAF's stringent requirements.
- Strict Deadlines: Imposing binding deadlines for the delivery of Tejas aircraft (for example, 40 Mk-1A jets by 2027), with penalties for any delays, to incentivize efficiency and adherence to schedules.
- Greater Private Sector Involvement: Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to delegate the production of subsystems, such as engines and avionics, to companies like Bharat Forge or Mahindra Defence Systems. This would allow HAL to concentrate on the final assembly and integration of the aircraft.
A similar proactive approach could help realign HAL with the IAF's needs, rebuild trust, and accelerate the production of domestically manufactured fighter jets.
The urgency of the situation is further heightened by regional security dynamics. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) reportedly operates over 150 J-20 stealth fighters. Additionally, Pakistan is enhancing its air force with the JF-17 Block III and is considering acquiring J-31 fighters, potentially diminishing India's aerial advantage.
The IAF, with its current strength of only 31 squadrons, faces a potential shortfall of approximately 200 fighter aircraft by 2030 if HAL's performance does not improve dramatically.
The Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender, intended to procure 114 foreign jets, remains unresolved, making indigenous production the crucial factor in maintaining India's air power. A malfunctioning HAL could force India into more expensive foreign acquisitions, straining the national budget and compromising the country's strategic independence.
