India's $7B AMCA Engine Deal with SAFRAN Ignites Fierce Debate on French Firm's Historical Tech-Sharing Failures

Recent reports of a potential agreement valued at approximately $7 billion (around ₹61,000 crore) between India and French aerospace leader SAFRAN has sparked a significant debate within the nation's defence community.

The deal focuses on the joint development of a powerful new jet engine for India's Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth-generation stealth fighter program.

While the partnership is being hailed as a major step towards modernising the Indian Air Force, it has also revived concerns over SAFRAN's past record on technology transfer.

Proponents of the deal point to the long and generally successful partnership between SAFRAN and India's state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This collaboration has been vital for India's helicopter fleet.

The Shakti engine, co-developed by the two firms, is the proven powerplant for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH-Dhruv), the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), and the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).

Having produced over 350 units in Bengaluru, the engine has demonstrated its reliability in extreme conditions, from the high altitudes of the Himalayas to maritime environments.

This established trust is a key reason SAFRAN is seen as a dependable partner for the ambitious AMCA project.

However, a cloud of scepticism hangs over the agreement, stemming from SAFRAN's past performance on technology sharing. Critics highlight that the transfer of technology (ToT) for the very same Shakti engine was reportedly delayed by nearly two decades.

This delay hampered HAL's ability to produce and maintain the engines independently, leading to continued reliance on imported components, which increased both costs and logistical challenges for India's defence forces.

This history has made many experts cautious, questioning whether the new promises of full technology sharing will be fulfilled in a timely manner.

The debate is deeply connected to India's overarching national policy of "Aatmanirbhar Bharat," or a self-reliant India. The nation's past struggles with developing its own jet engine, most notably the indigenous Kaveri engine program, have created wariness about becoming overly dependent on foreign partners for critical defence technology.

The AMCA is a flagship program for India's aerospace ambitions, and any restrictions or delays in engine technology could critically undermine the ability of the DRDO's Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to build a self-sustaining engine manufacturing ecosystem.

Supporters of the deal argue that the current terms directly address these historical concerns. The agreement for the new 120-kilonewton (kN) thrust engine reportedly includes the complete transfer of technology and, crucially, full intellectual property rights (IPR).

Granting India IPR would be a significant milestone, allowing the country to not only manufacture the engines domestically but also to modify, upgrade, and potentially export them in the future without foreign oversight.

This is seen as a genuine opportunity for India to become a global hub for advanced jet engine production.

The sheer scale of SAFRAN's involvement in India's military aviation underscores the importance of this deal. Beyond the AMCA, the co-developed engine technology is expected to be adapted for other platforms.

There is a projected demand for nearly 400 engines for the LUH and LCH fleets, in addition to future orders for 200 ALH-Dhruv helicopters and 400 units of the new Indian Multi-Role Helicopter (IMRH).

This extensive requirement makes a robust and complete technology transfer essential for cost-effective manufacturing and long-term operational readiness.

Ultimately, the SAFRAN partnership represents a critical balancing act for India—leveraging essential foreign expertise while vigorously pursuing the goal of self-reliance.

While the French firm's commitment to full technology transfer and IPR for the AMCA program is a source of confidence, the defence community remains watchful.

The success of this multi-billion dollar venture will depend entirely on SAFRAN's ability to deliver on its promises, which could finally enable India to achieve its long-held ambition of mastering jet engine technology.

 

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[Dr K Sham Sunder]

Spending Seven Billion dollars to develop an engine for AMCA is stupendously expensive. Since AMCA is also a totally new platform under development, with attendant delays, it would be wise to spend such a large money for an indigenous development effort. It will succeed, if handled well.

Take a cue from the LCA development history. Earlier to ADA, all development projects for fighter aircraft were getting nixed, for some reason or the other. The great scientific leaders at that time, who knew the reasons, came up with an autonomous organization, such as ADA, with high powered Governing & General bodies. Something similar be created to handle this new challenge. Such an organization will use GTRE as the main work centre, like HAL was for ADA, and bring in the strengths from other public and private organizations. For example, Engine Design Bureau of HAL can be assigned some tasks, on which they are confident of delivering and so on. Just follow LCA, model of development, everything will fall in place. ADA not only developed LCA, but developed entire ecosystem, involving nearly about hundred organizations and several specific technical consultancies from abroad. Today, we are much better of in terms of capabilities in private sector, compared to LCA development days.

 

[Dr K Sham Sunder]

Alternatively, go for a company promoted by private technocrat entrepreneurs, holding 51% equity and government 49% equity, with a share capital of Ten Thousand Crores. Let Government offer a grant aid of Ten thousand crores, to be spent in equal proportion to equity, at any given time. Private entrepreneurs are capable of catching hold of best retired brains, both in India and abroad, like one or two compressor design, one or two for Combustion chamber, similarly for turbine, performance of integrated engine etc. And use GTRE, Engine Design Bureau of HAL and Engine Factory of HAL as main/major work centers. It will be a matter of time just for things to fall in place. After all, a fourth generation fighter aircraft like LCA is a lot more complex animal to develop, compared to an engine development. If we have not developed so far, it is due to the limitations of an a unitary organization trying to develop, not because it is more complex than LCA.

Private promoters getting the ownership of 51% of IPR at 25% investment, under the above arrangement, is quite attractive. The entity can earn enormous royalty over years, by licensing the production. Also, it is neither fair nor reliable for private promoters to ask more comfort. Technocrat promoters such as Tatas, L&T, Kirloskars etc can join together to promote such a company.

 

[NAG]

Is govt or defence ministry really listening to people voices or for that matter experts in this field? The defence ministry is bent upon giving the contract to Safran, reasons better known only to them. There are more to it than meets the eye.
After sometime, and when something goes wrong, there will be some other minister, who will squarely blame the earlier one. It's public money and they should not allow this to happen.
The govt should simultaneously go with two tech transfer firms, one with DRDO/GTRE and another one with private sector collaborative entity. Whoever execute the first prototype within the timeline with 100% local eco system should be awarded the serial production.
India should stop trusting any outside collaborators 100%. Make and deliver in India only. After all it's 7 billion dollars!