DRDO success or failures can't be seen through a single prism. Just a year back, there was a serious effort to restructure DRDO, with an appreciation that DRDO is not delivering to the expectations. Now, every thing has become honky dory, after Operation Sindoor. The truth lies some where in between. You may like to see my comments & suggestions, put on a YouTube video talking about impending DRDO restructuring, in the following:
Please be aware that if the proposed restructuring fails, it has the potential to diminish the capability built over several decades. One should be very careful, so as to ensure that our mis-steps will not cause a disaster, for the future of Defence Research. I got interested in this topic, after I had seen an article in a newspaper, by Dr Aatre and Dr K G Narayanan, Distinguished Scientists of DRDO, expressing their genuine misgivings about the proposed restructuring. After that, I have searched the You Tube and got this video to understand and respond, with well thought out remarks. Trust they will reach the ears of those who matter for this restructuring.
At the outset, I certainly agree that there is a need to pragmatically think on how the Defence Research has to function in future, towards an improved success, keeping the past experience in view.To start with, there are wings in DRDO which have done exceedingly well, whether it is ADA spearheading the LCA development, which by any standards is an outstanding success Or the Integrated Missile Development programme, which has delivered immense capability to the national security. Infact, the benefits of just these two programs outweigh the combined losses from rest of the labs/projects, where applicable. Hence, there is a need to seperate the institutions and systems, which have succeeded from the restructuring, at least till we are sure that the new format delivers better. However, even in those institutions, there is a need to adopt compulsory retirement of scientists, above certain level, as being done in services, to prevent a top heavy structure which is definitely found to be counter productive.
What is our Past Experience?
1. We succeeded with a complex project like LCA, but failed with UAVs and Jet Engine developments, why?
Answer: In the case of LCA, right from the beginning we had an industrial partner HAL, who had hands on experience in manufacturing of aircrafts and a robust Design Bureau to support R&D activities. After ADA was created, right from inception HAL was always critical of ADA's ability to lead the project. An IAF oversight was that of a mother-in-law, not very optimistic about our joint abilities to deliver a fourth generation aircraft. As we succeeded, it added new requirements, given the delays in development. That difficult partnership made us to stand on our toes all the time, making a difference in the long run, when it cames to an eventual success. It is like husband and wife being critical of each other's capabilities, but join together to make the family succeed. In the case of UAVs and Jet engine development, there was no such industrial partnership or oversight by the user reps. That makes the difference.
2. DRDO Labs dealing with Individual systems: Mostly, they have succeeded, such as the development of radar etc. Reason being, often there will be few scientists in the lab, who are either genius and restless, and cannot sit idle without trying tirelessly. That doesn't apply to complex systems like engines or UAVs, where multi-disciplinary activities are involved with a demanding customer, in waiting. Any short fall in one system can make the overall project fail. Hence, there is a need not to distrub the labs which are functioning successfully.
3. Labs involved in areas, where there are under export controls, such as in missile development technologies:
They have succeeded, but incrementally. In such cases, every simple indigenous development is a success by itself, enthusing the scientists. Success breeds success, extending the confidence & capabilities, slowly but steadily, as can be seen in the Integrated Missile Development programme, over the years. Such an approach is not feasible for Fighter Aircraft or Jet Engine development, where the customer expects the DRDO to deliver a contemporary system, comparable to what he can otherwise import. He has his compulsions to demand that, given the security needs.
4. The Flexible Complimenting System for Promotions in DRDO: While being generous for individual career progression, is counter productive for a viable organisational structure. It often results in a very top heavy system which is inefficient. It should be modified to have an inbuilt system of compulsory retirements, as in services, beyond certain senior level (say Scientist/Engineer - E) to keep the organisation agile and in turn the team highly competent. Stale leaders at the top are often counter productive, leading to the current feeling, that DRDO is not delivering to the expectations. The introduction of premature retirements will keep the scientists on their toes, as it happens in services. Only the best will stay on to lead. Those relieved can always find alternative employment on the academic side, which is also beneficial to the educational institutions, as they will get faculty which has some field experience. DRDO can make that trasit attractive by a 2-3 year deputation to the concerned institutions, which penalty will be much less than having them till superannuation.
5. Too much 'Security' (for entry & exit):
Often, it makes the scientists lose their esteem and a sense of belonging to the organisation. After all, we could develop LCA with minimum security set up at ADA, but offered an excellent environment. It encouraged them to feel a sense of belonging to ADA and own up the LCA project and it's never ending challenges. Often, the scientists stayed much beyond the office hours and came on Saturdays too. In fact, they became work addicts, albeit without their conscious knowledge. When there was a suggestion from security incharge to introduce body frisking, as the scientists were often carrying drawings outside, it was jokingly told to him that often we ourselves get mixed up with various versions of drawings and softwares. So, why would anybody outside can make use of such discrete drawings and risk with huge investment to develop an LCA outside. Hence, DRDO labs should have a calibrated security environment based on a realistic assessment of what can really be used outside requiring some oversight & confidentiality, not on everything.
6. Offering Test Facilities to Private Developers:
Post my superannuation, I was associated with CSIR-NAL. With a view to generate revenue from the test facilities NAL had, we did offer them to private industry. The experience showed that the private industry cannot afford the rates evolved as per CSIR norms. Against that background, I suggest that DRDO should charge nominal charges, covering the revenue expenditure and consumables, with an overhead in terms of percentage. But not charge the infrastructure or scientist manpower costs which would be unaffordable by the private industry. Such an approach should be seen in the larger interest of the country, to support development projects in the private industry.
7. Why a senior scientist with right aptitude should be incharge of Procurement & Administration of the Lab:
After initial trials to use bureaucrats on deputation from government, a conscious decision was made by ADA to use a senior scientist with requisite aptitude to head these departments, as the bureaucrats were often became an obstruction, in the name rules. The real problem was that they can't understand the scientists language/needs and the scientists can't understand their rules. In fact, I was persuaded to take up the responsibility of Administration & Contracts, in addition being the head of aircraft structure development. While it was baptism by fire, I could make difference to the whole system, albeit after some initial learning for a few months. A larger number of international development contracts were finalised meeting the Phase -2 development schedules of LCA, in addition to multitude of contracts with private industry. As a scientist, I was able to understand the project needs, was able to tell the scientists in their own language on how to finalise precise SoWs, required for foolproof contracts. Yes, it was a real slog, but certainly helped the project.
8. Ordinance Factories:
Since HAL type of industrial base with design insight will not be available for all defence development projects, it is essential to examine whether Ordinance Factories in the given field are available to associate, with a concerned DRDO labs. However, I do agree that the non-scientific cadre at the technical level should be seperated, where feasible, so that the DRDO labs can function on the lines of ADA, with only scientific manpower.
9. Summary :
a. Don't distrub successful set ups like ADA and Integrated Missile Development labs, at least for the time being, till we succeed with our new systems elsewhere. However, the compulsory retirement of scientists as in services be introduced.
b. Similarly, individual system level labs which are successful. However, the projects may be sanctioned through end-users for a proper oversight and accountability. For example, a radar required by LCA, through ADA.
c. In the case of engine, the capabilities of GTRE and HAL Engine Design Bureau (& Engine factory) be put together ,as in the case of LCA, for a successful development of a jet-engine, which is the need of the hour.
d. HAL and ADA have to play a role in UAVs. The structure should be similar to LCA development.
About me. I am an Outstanding Scientist & a former Project Director of ADA, who had closely worked on LCA, the Tejas, which at last considered an outstanding success after many trials and tribulations. I worked from the inception of the project for 22 years, prior to my superannuation in Nov 2008. I was holding additional charge of Director(Admin & Contracts) and Secretary-ADA, for seven years.
Thanks for your patience. 🙏
