Pakistan's history of illicit nuclear networks continues to cast a shadow over its non-proliferation credentials, fuelling concerns over the possible diffusion of dual-use technology, whether intentional or accidental, a report has stated.
That legacy has left Pakistan's nuclear governance under continued scrutiny, with any expansion of fissile-material capacity or advanced laboratory work viewed with suspicion. The resulting trust deficit raises the political cost of Pakistan’s nuclear choices and could further complicate its efforts to access advanced technologies, a report in the 'Greek City Times' detailed.
“Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always been organised around military need. That priority still shapes how it builds facilities, produces fissile material and writes doctrine. Because the country remains outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons sit at the centre of national defence and regional deterrence. The result is lasting concern about how dual-use materials and technologies are handled—and what that means for stability in South Asia,” the report mentioned.
“From the start, Pakistani leaders treated a bomb as an existential requirement against a larger neighbour and as the ultimate equaliser in an unbalanced security environment. Nuclear capability was never folded into a broad energy or industrial plan. It grew out of a crisis narrative built on threat perception and historical grievance. Expansion of warheads and delivery systems has consistently outranked the development of a serious civilian nuclear sector. The technical base has grown, but mainly in ways that serve weaponisation,” it mentioned.
According to the report, Pakistan’s limited reliance on nuclear power exposes a striking imbalance in its priorities. Despite severe electricity shortages, it said, the country has failed to establish a broad-based civilian nuclear sector capable of supporting the grid and industry.
The report noted that political and financial resources have instead flowed into defence programmes, missiles and warhead infrastructure, leaving technologies that could contribute to development largely embedded in the country’s “deterrence and prestige”.
It warned that growth of Pakistan’s arsenal, evolving nuclear doctrine and secretive handling of dual-use material pose several risks.
“Crisis can move faster than communication channels, especially if tactical nuclear options are folded into conventional planning. Misreading the location, readiness or security of nuclear assets can feed pre-emptive thinking or unintended escalation. In that climate, even a minor technical incident at a nuclear site can be read as preparation for attack,” the report highlighted.
Emphasising that “rhetorical assurances of safety” are not enough, it said, “Pakistan would need a real shift in how nuclear policy is conceived and explained. Clearer separation of civil and military activity, fuller public reporting on safety, greater openness to international peer review, and an explicit limit on fissile-material production would all reduce dual-use risk. None of those steps would automatically weaken deterrence. They would simply pull the programme away from a purely military identity.”
