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India's pursuit of a domestically produced 110kN engine for its Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program has brought it to the negotiating table with French engine manufacturer Safran.
However, past experiences and technological disparities raise serious questions about the wisdom of this partnership, particularly concerning technology transfer.
A former employee of India's Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), the organization responsible for developing indigenous engine technology, recently voiced strong concerns about the ongoing negotiations, characterizing the discussions as unproductive.
The ex-official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, warned that France has a history of making ambitious promises regarding technology transfer but failing to deliver fully. This pattern, the source suggests, could put India's fifth-generation fighter program at risk.
The official cited a previous attempt in the early 2010s to co-develop a hybrid engine for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program. This involved combining elements of India's Kaveri engine with Safran's M88 engine, which powers the Rafale fighter jet.
The technology transfer offered by the French at the time was reportedly minimal, focusing on less critical components. Safran, the official stated, insisted on retaining intellectual property rights (IPR) for the core of the M88-2 engine, the most crucial part for performance. This disagreement ultimately led GTRE to abandon the collaboration.
The proposed M88-Kaveri hybrid was also limited to 83-85kN of thrust. This was insufficient for the Tejas Mk2's 98kN thrust requirement, and suitable only for Tejas Mk1.
Moreover, Safran required a minimum order of 300 engines, a number that did not align with the Indian Air Force's (IAF) needs, which at one point included studying a "universal" engine for both Tejas Mk1 and Mk2.
Another point of contention raised was a "technical audit" of the Kaveri engine, reportedly conducted by a French team as part of the 2016 Rafale fighter jet deal. While the French team cleared the Kaveri for flight testing, the former GTRE employee downplayed the significance of their contribution.
The source claimed that GTRE had already resolved most of the major issues of Kaveri, including problems within the engine's core, before the audit. Subsequent collaboration with General Electric (GE) of the United States, according to the official, proved more beneficial in addressing remaining technical hurdles.
These past experiences are particularly relevant as India considers Safran as a partner for the AMCA's 110kN engine, a crucial component for the stealth fighter's performance. The former GTRE insider expressed skepticism about France's current proposals, highlighting a significant technological gap.
The official pointed out that Safran had been unwilling to share technology for a fourth-generation engine (the M88) previously, and now proposes co-development of a fifth-generation engine, a technology they have not yet developed themselves.
Indeed, while countries like the United States (with the F135 engine for the F-35 and ongoing adaptive engine programs) and Russia (with the Izdeliye 30 for the Su-57) have operational or developing fifth-generation engines, France's current offering, the M88, is a design dating back to the 1980s with a maximum thrust of around 75kN (with afterburner).
This disparity, the former official argued, casts doubt on France's ability to contribute meaningfully to the AMCA engine project. The successful development of a powerful and reliable engine is crucial for the AMCA to meet its performance goals, and any shortcomings in technology transfer could significantly impede India's progress towards achieving self-reliance in defense technology.
