India's unveiling of its domestically produced Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, intended for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and Super Sukhoi upgrade, has sparked debate in defense circles.
This indigenous radar, created by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), signifies a major advancement in India's pursuit of self-reliance in crucial military technology.
However, this development raises a key question: why isn't India using this advanced radar, alongside indigenous mission computers, to upgrade its 36 Rafale fighter jets? These jets currently utilize Gallium Arsenide (GaS)-based AESA radars and foreign-made avionics.
While such an upgrade could potentially remove the need for French approval to integrate additional Indian weapon systems, intellectual property rights (IPR) and geopolitical factors pose substantial challenges.
The GaN-based AESA radar, developed by DRDO's Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE), is a substantial improvement over existing GaS-based systems. GaN technology provides increased power efficiency, a wider detection range, enhanced resistance to jamming, and superior thermal management.
This radar is slated to provide improved situational awareness and combat effectiveness for both the AMCA (a fifth-generation stealth fighter) and the Super Sukhoi upgrade program, modernizing India's Su-30 MKI fleet.
A GaN-based derivative of the Uttam AESA radar, called Virupaksha, is reportedly being customized for the Sukhoi upgrade, with initial integration planned for 84 Su-30 MKIs.
The success of the indigenous radar has led defence analysts to question the absence of a similar upgrade for India's Rafale fleet. Acquired from France's Dassault Aviation in a 2016 deal, the 36 Rafale jets are equipped with the Thales RBE2 AESA radar, which uses GaS technology.
The RBE2 is a reliable system, but it does not possess the advanced features of GaN-based radars. Moreover, integrating it with Indian weapon systems has been subject to French oversight and approval.
A primary argument for upgrading the Rafale with indigenous GaN-based AESA radars and mission computers is enhanced operational independence.
Currently, the integration of Indian weapon systems, such as the Astra Mk-1 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile and the Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW), requires French approval because the aircraft's avionics and radar software are proprietary to Dassault and Thales. This dependence restricts India's ability to adapt the Rafale to its specific operational needs independently.
Dassault recently secured a contract to integrate the Astra Mk-1 and SAAW onto India's Rafale fleet. While this improves compatibility with indigenous weapons, it comes at a financial and strategic cost. Each integration necessitates extensive testing, certification, and software updates by France, frequently causing delays and extra expenses.
Theoretically, replacing the Rafale's GaS-based radar and mission computers with indigenous systems could bypass these obstacles, allowing for quicker and more affordable integration of Indian weapon systems.
Furthermore, indigenous mission computers could offer India increased control over the aircraft's software, facilitating seamless upgrades and modifications without reliance on foreign vendors. This aligns with India's "Atmanirbhar Bharat" initiative, which aims to decrease dependence on foreign technology and lessen risks associated with supply chain disruptions or geopolitical tensions.
Despite these potential advantages, upgrading the Rafale with indigenous systems faces a major hurdle: intellectual property rights (IPR). Reports suggest France is unlikely to compromise on the Rafale's radar and avionics.
The RBE2 AESA radar and related avionics are proprietary technologies of Thales and Dassault, and France is resolute in protecting its IPR. Permitting India to replace these systems with indigenous counterparts would not only harm France's commercial interests but also create a precedent for other Rafale customers to request similar changes.
The Rafale agreement, while including India-Specific Enhancements (ISE) like helmet-mounted displays and integration of certain Indian weapons, did not include technology transfer for the radar or avionics. France's refusal to share source codes or permit third-party modifications is driven by both strategic and economic factors.
The Rafale's avionics suite is fundamental to its combat capability, and maintaining control over this technology ensures France's influence over the aircraft's use and upgrades by its operators. France has historically maintained a very tight control over the technology used in its defense exports.
Replacing the Rafale's radar and mission computers would also necessitate extensive re-certification of the aircraft's systems, a process that could span years and incur significant costs. Integrating new hardware would require rewriting software, recalibrating flight control systems, and verifying compatibility with the Rafale's other subsystems—all requiring French cooperation. Without access to proprietary data and source codes, India would encounter formidable technical and logistical difficulties in implementing such an upgrade.
Beyond IPR constraints, strategic and operational considerations exist. The Rafale fleet, though small, is a crucial asset for the Indian Air Force (IAF), providing a technological advantage in air superiority and precision strike missions.
Any upgrade involving the replacement of its radar and avionics would temporarily ground these jets, potentially affecting the IAF's operational readiness during a period of heightened regional tensions with China and Pakistan.
The RBE2 radar, although GaS-based, is a mature and combat-proven system optimized for the Rafale's airframe and weapons. Replacing it with an indigenous GaN-based radar, despite its technological superiority in some areas, carries risks of unforeseen integration problems. The IAF may prefer to avoid such uncertainties, particularly given the Rafale's role as a frontline fighter in its current configuration.
While a complete replacement of the Rafale's radar and avionics may be unfeasible in the short term, there is potential for incremental collaboration with France to improve the aircraft's compatibility with Indian systems.
The recent agreement to integrate the Astra Mk-1 and SAAW represents progress, and future negotiations could aim for greater access to software interfaces or co-development of upgrades incorporating GaN-based technologies without replacing the core systems.
Concurrently, India's emphasis on indigenous programs like the AMCA and Super Sukhoi upgrade presents a more practical way to utilize its GaN-based AESA radar.
By equipping its domestically produced and Russian-origin platforms with advanced indigenous systems, India can establish a robust ecosystem of locally developed technologies, gradually reducing dependence on foreign vendors.
