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Beijing has yet to make any formal diplomatic protests or public announcements concerning India's monumental S5-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) initiative.
Instead of issuing official government statements, China’s reaction is largely seen in its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the ongoing enlargement of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the observations made by Chinese defence experts.
Expected to be the cornerstone of India’s future maritime nuclear deterrence, the S5 programme will build upon the foundation laid by the current Arihant-class submarines.
Open-source data indicates the new S5 class will be massive, displacing between 13,500 and 17,000 tonnes—roughly double the size of the Arihant class.
These next-generation vessels are designed to carry up to 12 to 16 vertical launch tubes for the advanced K-5 or K-6 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), offering striking ranges between 5,000 to 9,000 kilometres and featuring multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).
While Beijing remains quiet publicly, strategic experts believe China recognizes this project as a major leap in India’s quest to solidify its second-strike nuclear capabilities and assert its dominance in the Indo-Pacific.
Rather than engaging in a war of words, China has opted for action by scaling up its operational footprint across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Over the last ten years, the PLAN has consistently sent its Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarines and Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines on missions far beyond the South China Sea.
This outward push is bolstered by an ever-growing web of overseas logistical hubs and dual-use port facilities.
Today, Chinese naval movements in the Indian Ocean are a normal occurrence. Regular activities include submarine patrols, intelligence-gathering operations, and long-term deployments of surface fleets.
Defence analysts view these sustained deployments as Beijing’s on-the-ground countermeasure to India’s broader naval modernisation, rather than a specific retaliation to any single Indian defence project.
Simultaneously, China has been upgrading the infrastructure required to support its own nuclear submarine forces.
The Longpo Naval Base on Hainan Island serves as the primary hub for the PLAN’s strategic fleet.
Additionally, Beijing has secured critical overseas access through its military base in Djibouti and deepened its maritime partnership with Pakistan.
Strategic observers note that Chinese investments in the Gwadar port and other commercial ventures across the Indian Ocean give Beijing the vital flexibility needed to keep its warships deployed far from home shores.
In the eyes of Chinese defence scholars, India’s drive to modernise its submarine fleet is seen as a natural outcome of strategic rivalry in the region, rather than an immediate threat that overturns China's military dominance.
State-backed commentators frequently point out that the PLAN still holds the upper hand when it comes to the sheer number of vessels, shipbuilding capacity, and advanced underwater warfare technology.
They argue that China continues to enjoy a comfortable lead in producing nuclear submarines and mastering deep-sea operations.
A large portion of this Chinese commentary highlights the steep technical hurdles India must still overcome to field next-generation nuclear submarines.
Experts often note the immense difficulty of creating ultra-quiet nuclear reactors, cutting-edge propulsion methods, complex sonar systems, and hull designs that minimize noise.
For example, India is currently developing a powerful 190 to 200-megawatt pressurised light-water reactor through the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to power the S5 class, which requires highly advanced engineering to ensure both speed and stealth.
Chinese analysts suggest these factors remain the toughest roadblocks for any indigenous submarine programme.
Despite these challenges, the S5 project marks a massive leap forward for India’s strategic deterrence.
Recent reports suggest the project has achieved major milestones, with steel-cutting for the first S5 boat reportedly completed in late 2025 at a newly enhanced dry dock at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam.
By fielding much larger submarines armed with intercontinental-range missiles, the Indian Navy will be able to conduct highly secure nuclear patrols. This formidable upgrade is crucial for maintaining a robust and credible sea-based component of India’s nuclear triad.
However, from Beijing's viewpoint, the geopolitical chess game involves much more than just ballistic missile submarines.
Chinese military strategists continue to prioritize dominance in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), nuclear attack submarines, and extensive underwater surveillance grids.
By pouring resources into next-generation sonar, ocean-floor sensors, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and a rapidly expanding attack submarine fleet, China aims to secure undeniable undersea supremacy throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Ultimately, instead of showing panic over India's S5 programme, China’s strategic focus is on balancing any Indian naval advancements with the relentless growth of the PLAN.
This approach mirrors China's long-term philosophy: securing a decisive numerical and technological edge while making its widespread presence in the Indian Ocean the new normal.
For India, the S5 programme is universally seen as a central pillar of its future maritime security. By deploying massive SSBNs equipped with long-range weapons, the Indian Navy can launch deterrent patrols from secure waters closer to the Indian coast, significantly reducing the risk of detection.
Coupled with the parallel construction of indigenous 10,000-tonne Project-77 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), the S5 initiative is poised to dramatically transform India’s underwater combat and deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
