Recent global assessments suggesting that India might have deployed nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) on routine patrols have sparked discussions about a potential shift in the nation's nuclear stance.
However, according to retired Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharma, a former commander of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), these assumptions misread both India’s strategic doctrine and the fundamental role of sea-based nuclear deterrence.
In a detailed interview, the former SFC commander highlighted that India’s established nuclear framework remains fundamentally unchanged.
The nation's policy is still anchored in three core principles: No First Use (NFU), Credible Minimum Deterrence, and the promise of Massive Retaliation in the event of a nuclear strike.
He clarified that the operational deployment of India’s submarine fleet does not signal a policy pivot, but rather represents the expected maturation of a complete nuclear triad.
Sea-Based Deterrence Strengthens India’s Second-Strike Capability
This strategic conversation comes amid heightened interest in India’s SSBN capabilities, particularly regarding the operational patrols of vessels like INS Arihant and the broader expansion of the naval fleet.According to Lt Gen Sharma, it is standard practice for an SSBN on active patrol to carry armed ballistic missiles, as its main objective is to ensure an assured second-strike capability.
This sea-based leg of the triad has been significantly reinforced in recent years, notably with the commissioning of the second Arihant-class submarine, INS Arighaat, in August 2024, and the more recent induction of the larger INS Aridhaman in April 2026, which is equipped with longer-range K-4 ballistic missiles.
The former commander explained that land-based silos and air-delivered weapons are inherently vulnerable to a sudden, preemptive strike.
In contrast, a nuclear-powered submarine operating quietly in the deep ocean serves as the most survivable component of the nuclear triad. This guarantees that India can launch a devastating counter-attack even if its land-based systems are compromised.
He emphasized that deploying an active SSBN should be seen as the practical application of India's stated defence strategy, rather than an escalation in aggression.
No First Use Policy Remains the Foundation
The interview firmly dismissed any speculation that New Delhi is stepping away from its No First Use commitment.Lt Gen Sharma reaffirmed that India views nuclear armaments strictly as political tools meant for deterrence, not as weapons for battlefield deployment. Their ultimate function is to deter adversaries from starting a nuclear war by guaranteeing an unacceptably high cost in response.
He pointed out that India’s doctrine has always acknowledged the grim necessity of surviving an initial nuclear attack while retaining enough firepower to deliver a catastrophic retaliatory blow. A robust sea-based deterrent enhances the believability of this pledge without altering the underlying policy.
This is a crucial clarification, as several international observers have incorrectly cited India's growing submarine fleet as proof of an evolving, more aggressive nuclear posture. As the former SFC chief noted, the technological hardware has advanced, but the foundational doctrine stands firm.
Why Operational SSBN Patrols Matter
In contemporary nuclear strategy, the survivability of retaliatory forces is of paramount importance.Unlike stationary missile silos or known air force bases, ballistic missile submarines are exceptionally challenging to detect and destroy. Even the most advanced global surveillance systems cannot guarantee the uninterrupted tracking of a submarine navigating the vast expanses of the ocean.
This inherent unpredictability is the very foundation of effective nuclear deterrence.
India’s long-term strategic goal, as outlined by Lt Gen Sharma, is to maintain a rotational fleet of multiple SSBNs. This approach ensures that at least one submarine is always on active deterrent patrol while others are undergoing maintenance, transit, or training operations.
This model of Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD) is a standard practice among established nuclear powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
With the steady expansion of its domestically built submarine fleet, India is gradually moving towards achieving this continuous maritime posture.
Credible Minimum Deterrence Is Dynamic, Not Static
A significant takeaway from the discussion is that "credible minimum deterrence" is not a static figure of weapons or delivery systems.Instead, Lt Gen Sharma characterized it as a fluid concept that must adapt to shifts in the regional security environment.
While China continuously upgrades its strategic arsenal with longer-range missiles, MIRV capabilities, and advanced platforms, Pakistan is also expanding its missile inventory and tactical nuclear options.
Given these regional dynamics, India cannot allow its deterrent capabilities to stagnate.
He argued that maintaining a credible posture requires the continuous modernization of missile ranges, warhead sophistication, platform survivability, and delivery systems, rather than just pursuing a higher quantity of weapons.
Numbers Alone Do Not Define Nuclear Strength
Addressing recent independent estimates—such as the 2026 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report placing India’s nuclear inventory at approximately 190 warheads—the interview highlighted that mere numerical comparisons offer a flawed view of deterrence capability.Unlike the intense arms races seen during the Cold War between global superpowers, India’s goal is not to match the sheer volume of weapons held by larger nuclear states.
Instead, the strategic focus remains firmly on securing the capacity to inflict devastating and unacceptable damage on any attacker in the aftermath of a nuclear first strike.
This core philosophy has directed India’s nuclear policy since its inception and remains the guiding force behind its current defence modernization.
