Opinion How Merging AMCA and TEDBF Can Slash Development Costs by 30-40% and Halve Timelines, Potentially Avoiding Tejas-Like Delays

How Merging AMCA and TEDBF Can Slash Development Costs by 30-40% and Halve Timelines, Potentially Avoiding Tejas-Like Delays


India's defence planners are currently standing at a critical juncture regarding the future of the nation's aerial combat capabilities.

They must decide whether to merge the Indian Air Force's (IAF) Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Indian Navy's Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) into a unified family of aircraft, or continue on separate paths.

Experts caution that maintaining distinct development tracks could allow foreign acquisitions, such as the proposed massive procurement of 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA), to overshadow indigenous projects.

This scenario would mirror past situations where domestic innovation was sidelined by urgent imports.

A unified approach is increasingly viewed as essential, particularly as the military looks toward future platforms like next-generation nuclear-powered aircraft carriers equipped with Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch Systems (EMALS).

The AMCA represents India's premier fifth-generation stealth fighter initiative.

Upgraded to a 25-tonne weight class, the aircraft is designed for deep-penetration strikes with features like internal weapons bays, supercruise capabilities, and AI-driven avionics.

Recent engineering milestones, such as the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) validating an S-duct intake design that achieves an exceptional 98% pressure recovery, highlight its rapid progress toward a projected first flight in 2028 and mass production by the mid-2030s.

This timeline is vital for the IAF, which currently operates around 31 fighter squadrons—well below the sanctioned strength of 42—and faces further depletions with the phasing out of older jets.

In parallel, the TEDBF is a dedicated maritime fighter intended for carriers like the INS Vikrant.

While it shares advanced avionics with the AMCA, it incorporates naval-specific modifications such as folding wings and strengthened landing gear for carrier deck operations.

The ADA finalized the TEDBF's aerodynamic configuration in April 2026, shifting the focus toward rigorous wind-tunnel testing, though its first flight is now expected closer to the 2030-2032 timeframe.

Running these two advanced fighter programmes concurrently places a heavy burden on India's defence budget.

Separate research and development efforts duplicate work, strain funding, and stretch the domestic aerospace supply chain.

To resolve this, military leaders, including former Navy Chief Admiral Arun Prakash, are strongly advocating for a consolidated "Naval-AMCA" (N-AMCA) model.

This strategy would establish a Joint Service Qualitative Requirement (JSQR) to bridge the needs of both the IAF and the Navy.

By adapting the AMCA's stealth airframe for carrier operations and sharing powerplants—initially the GE F-414 and eventually an indigenous 110-120 kN engine—development costs could be reduced by an estimated 30 to 40 percent.

This unified framework mirrors successful international models, such as the American F-35 programme, which developed land, maritime, and vertical-lift variants from a single core design.

A successful merger, however, must extend beyond the fighter jets themselves to include a comprehensive combat ecosystem.

The Indian Navy's long-term vision includes acquiring a 65,000 to 75,000-tonne next-generation aircraft carrier (IAC-III) equipped with EMALS, replacing traditional ski-jump ramps to allow for heavier payloads and seamless drone launches.

Supporting this, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) recently developed a scaled-down technology demonstrator of an Electro-Magnetic Launch System (EMLS), paving the way for full-scale domestic catapults.

Furthermore, future aerial warfare will rely heavily on Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T).

By integrating unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's (HAL) CATS Warrior and NewSpace's Abhimanyu, N-AMCA pilots could command drone swarms directly from the cockpit for reconnaissance and strike missions.

This synergy would significantly multiply India's force projection capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region without needing to vastly expand manned fleets.

The urgency of this consolidation is underscored by the historical challenges faced during the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas programme.

Chronic delays, primarily caused by foreign engine supply bottlenecks and production limitations, resulted in a slow induction rate over four decades.

To address immediate operational gaps, the government imported 36 Rafale fighters in 2016.

Today, there are concerns that a massive $24.5 billion procurement for 114 foreign fighters could similarly divert crucial funding and urgency away from indigenous projects like the AMCA and Tejas Mk2.

Observers warn that off-the-shelf imports perpetuate technological dependency and cost significantly more per unit than homegrown alternatives.

Supporters of the combined N-AMCA project argue that establishing a single Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to manage development would drastically streamline the process.

Not only could this strategy cut project timelines in half, but it would also firmly align with the government's Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative by targeting a 70% indigenisation rate.

Ultimately, a highly capable, cost-effective, and unified fighter family could transform India from an importer of combat aircraft to a competitive exporter on the global stage.
 
Chronic delays, primarily caused by foreign engine supply bottlenecks and production limitations, resulted in a slow induction rate over four decades.

The first part of that statement is simply not true. Over four decades the only 'foreign engine supply bottlenecks' have been for 1 engine and that in the last 3 years. It has not taken 40 years to produce a fighter that meets requirements primarily because of an engine delivery delay in the last 3 years.

And to add a little more reality to the Mk1A delivery delay, had engines arrived on time delivery of aircraft would not have taken place because not all systems in the aircraft had been certified.
 
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How Merging AMCA and TEDBF Can Slash Development Costs by 30-40% and Halve Timelines, Potentially Avoiding Tejas-Like Delays

If there was a possibility of a modified, navalised AMCA meeting carrier requirements, why was that not proposed years ago instead of starting to design TEDBF? Would be good if AMCA's low speed flight characteristics could be altered to allow it to operate from a carrier. It is a much more advanced design than the proposed TEDBF design, isn't it?
 
Except design, many parts can be shared including Engines. Infact, both the planes are designed for GE 414. GAN based radar can be same or tweaked for variant.
 
Except design, many parts can be shared including Engines. Infact, both the planes are designed for GE 414. GAN based radar can be same or tweaked for variant.
Sounds beneficial but sharing parts/systems is very different to merging the 2 programmes. To me that means starting with 2 programmes and reducing that to 1 programme.
 
Sounds beneficial but sharing parts/systems is very different to merging the 2 programmes. To me that means starting with 2 programmes and reducing that to 1 programme.

Main difference will be landing gear which will require totally new design. This is going to be a very potent fighter. If we can get it along with AMCA, it will create a lot of interest and secessions in potential buyers. Push both the program fast. We do have 2 6th generation programs pending.
 
Project execution is lot about management, crashing of critical activities etc. We have many cases when because of unavailability of some critical component, whole project got delayed. This is an example of poor project management.
 
This is a very bad idea. We saw this happen to LCA-AF and LCA-N. Finally good sense prevailed. The requirements of a land based and a carrier based fighter are completely different. In terms of Airframe design, engine design and configuration. Yes develop avionics and weapon systems for the AMCA and use them in the TEDBF. Do not merge the two programs. You will neither get here nor there. The author quotes the F-35 example. The three versions A, B and C are each different ac. The only commonality is in systems. Each is different in size, Airframe layout, weight, engine configuration. The only commonality is in the name F-35.
 
The first part of that statement is simply not true. Over four decades the only 'foreign engine supply bottlenecks' have been for 1 engine and that in the last 3 years. It has not taken 40 years to produce a fighter that meets requirements primarily because of an engine delivery delay in the last 3 years.

And to add a little more reality to the Mk1A delivery delay, had engines arrived on time delivery of aircraft would not have taken place because not all systems in the aircraft had been certified.
That point we would like sweep it under the carper. Six engines have been delivered and not one a/c had been delivered even after HAL chief repeatedly says that everthing is ready but for engines. Most us love GE bashing and don't want to look at the truth. Also from what I heard even the Mk1 deliveries are not complete only 38 of 40 have been delivered.
 
That point we would like sweep it under the carper. Six engines have been delivered and not one a/c had been delivered even after HAL chief repeatedly says that everthing is ready but for engines. Most us love GE bashing and don't want to look at the truth. Also from what I heard even the Mk1 deliveries are not complete only 38 of 40 have been delivered.
Sorry, cannot remember the source but the story I heard was that several years ago IAF was promised delivery of the 2 outstanding trainers within a few months.

It is May now. I believe that HAL is due to meet with IAF to discuss the Mk1A situation. In IAF's shoes I would want to find out

- why certification of Mk1A is delayed
- if HAL is concealing problems for which it currently has no solution

Is it HAL's culture to attribute failure to hold to schedule to some other entity wherever possible? If HAL is going to be building Tejas Mk2, problems with deliveries of that aircraft should come as no surprise if they transpire.

What about AMCA? I would say avoid making changes to further delay things by 'merging' AMCA and TEDBF. Systems developed for AMCA can be migrated to TEDBF where practical.
 
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